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windows-ps-security【数据与研究】Use when hardening Windows systems via PowerShell — Windows Firewall (NetSecurity), Windows Defender/Microsoft Defender, BitLocker drive encryption, audit policy and event log analysis, local security policy, credential management (SecureString, Windows Credential Manager), AppLocker, Windows Update management, and security compliance scanning. Part …
独立 GitHub 快照 · 自动分类 · 以原作者文档为准
Companion skill to windows-powershell (parent). Focused on security hardening, compliance, and threat mitigation on Windows 10/11 and Windows Server 2019/2022/2025.
Detailed code examples, patterns, and configuration are in the reference files below. Read the relevant file when working on that area.
| File | Covers |
|---|---|
| credentials-applocker-compliance.md | credential management, AppLocker, local security policy, Windows Update management, security compliance, network security, user account security, and the quick security audit script |
| firewall-defender-bitlocker-audit.md | Windows Firewall (NetSecurity), Windows Defender/Microsoft Defender, BitLocker drive encryption, and audit policy/event log analysis |
| Anti-Pattern | Why It Fails | Correct Approach |
|---|---|---|
| Disabling UAC or Windows Defender for "convenience" | Removes primary defense layers; malware runs with full privileges; fails every security audit | Configure exclusions for specific paths/processes; use GPO to manage settings rather than disabling wholesale |
| Storing passwords in scripts as plain text | Scripts in SCM, shared drives, or backup tapes expose credentials; single compromise escalates to domain admin | Use Get-Credential, SecureString, or external vaults (Azure Key Vault, CyberArk); never hardcode credentials |
| Not enabling PowerShell ScriptBlock logging | No visibility into what scripts execute; incident response has no forensic trail; attackers operate undetected | Enable ScriptBlock and Module logging via GPO; forward to SIEM; essential for detecting encoded/obfuscated attacks |
| Using NTLM authentication instead of Kerberos | NTLM is vulnerable to relay attacks, pass-the-hash, and brute force; cannot use modern security features | Restrict NTLM via GPO (Network security: Restrict NTLM); audit NTLM usage first, then block progressively |
| Running PowerShell remoting without JEA (Just Enough Administration) | Full administrative sessions over WinRM; any command can be executed; no command-level access control | Configure JEA endpoints with role capabilities; limit available cmdlets and parameters per role |
| Skill | Scope |
|---|---|
windows-powershell | Parent skill — core PowerShell syntax, modules, remoting, scripting patterns |
windows-ps-server-admin | Windows Server roles (AD DS, DNS, DHCP, IIS, Hyper-V, clustering) |
windows-cmd | Legacy CMD commands, batch scripting, low-level system tools |