---

name: together-security-basics description: >- Secure Together AI integrations with project-scoped keys, environment isolation, prompt/output data controls, bounded model behavior, safe logging, rotation, and incident response. Use when threat-modeling or hardening Together usage. Trigger with "Together security", "protect Together API key", or "Together data controls". argument-hint: "[repository-path] [environment] [data-classification]" allowed-tools: Read, Glob, Grep, WebFetch, Write, Edit version: 1.9.0 author: Jeremy Longshore jeremy@intentsolutions.io license: MIT tags:

• saas
• together-ai
• security model: inherit effort: high compatibility: Designed for Claude Code; verification may require secret-store and Together AI project access

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Together AI Security Basics

Overview

This skill maps credentials, data, model output, tool use, logs, and paid asynchronous actions to explicit controls and owners.

Prerequisites

• Data classification and approved Together use cases
• Project/environment inventory and credential owners
• Request/response logging, retention, and deletion policy
• Model-output validation and any downstream tool-execution boundary

Tool Discipline

Use Read, Glob, and Grep to find provider calls, secrets, logging, persistence, and model-output consumers. Use WebFetch for current Together authentication and API behavior. Use Write or Edit only for approved controls; never read or reproduce secret values.

Current Contract

• Together keys are project-scoped; create separate development, CI, and production credentials.
• Keep keys server-side and out of source, browser bundles, prompts, logs, fixtures, and fork workflows.
• Treat prompts, uploaded files, outputs, model IDs, and job artifacts according to their data classification.
• Model output is untrusted input to downstream systems; validate structure and require authorization for side effects.

Authentication

Inject TOGETHER_API_KEY from an approved secret store and send it only as the SDK credential or Bearer header over HTTPS. Define rotation, revocation, leak detection, owner removal, and emergency shutdown procedures.

Instructions

1. Inventory keys, projects, callers, endpoints, data classes, storage, and downstream actions.
2. Remove tracked or client-side credentials and separate secrets by environment and workload.
3. Minimize prompt/upload content, redact diagnostics, and enforce retention/deletion policy.
4. Validate structured output and isolate any tool execution behind independent authorization.
5. Bound tokens, concurrency, retries, batch/fine-tune submissions, and dedicated provisioning.
6. Test credential revocation, provider failure, prompt injection, unsafe output, and incident response.

Approval Boundaries

Do not upload sensitive datasets, enable model-driven side effects, broaden key sharing, or retain prompts/outputs beyond policy without the named data and security authorities.

Output

Return trust boundaries, key/project map, data-flow controls, output-validation rules, cost/side-effect bounds, test evidence, gaps, owners, and remediation deadlines.

Error Handling

Condition	Response
Credential is exposed	Revoke or rotate immediately and scrub retained artifacts.
Data classification unknown	Stop before sending or uploading content.
Output fails validation	Reject it; do not coerce unsafe content into an action.
Provider access is abused	Disable the affected key/project path and preserve audit evidence.

Examples

The example below shows the minimum redacted evidence expected from a successful invocation of this operator workflow.

keys=per-environment; prompts=minimized; outputs=untrusted-validated; side-effects=separately-authorized

Resources

• Skill-specific official documentation
• Authentication
• Chat API
• Error codes