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miro-security-basics【数据与研究】Audit and harden repository-side Miro OAuth, session, storage, scope, logging, and board-data controls against common integration failures. Use when security-reviewing a Miro app. Trigger with "secure Miro integration".
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name: miro-security-basics description: "Audit and harden repository-side Miro OAuth, session, storage, scope, logging, and board-data controls against common integration failures. Use when security-reviewing a Miro app. Trigger with "secure Miro integration"." argument-hint: "[environment] [threat-scope]" allowed-tools: Read, Glob, Grep, WebFetch, Write, Edit version: 1.9.0 author: Jeremy Longshore jeremy@intentsolutions.io license: MIT tags:
Apply a minimum security baseline tied to Miro's supported authorization model and the app's actual data flows. Eliminate obsolete webhook assumptions from the threat model; use the evidence produced here to make the next decision explicit and reviewable.
Use Read, Glob, and Grep to inspect the repository, configuration names, adapters, tests, and evidence. Use WebFetch only for current official Miro documentation. Use Write or Edit after confirming the requested mode, target environment, tenant, board, and approval boundary. These declared tools do not call authenticated Miro APIs or deployment CLIs; implement client, configuration, and test changes, then return exact operator commands or an approval-gated handoff for live execution.
HttpOnly and Secure; OAuth callbacks require session-bound state validation.For REST work, use OAuth 2.0 Authorization Code with the narrowest Miro scopes. Bind each encrypted token record to its user, application, authorized team, and granted scopes. Never print access tokens, refresh tokens, client secrets, authorization codes, or board content.
Do not add scopes, retain board content, weaken cookie/CSRF controls, or introduce an experimental platform dependency without security and data-owner approval. Pause when the responsible owner or exact target is uncertain.
Return threat boundaries, scope diff, control evidence, negative-test results, data-retention map, open risks, and remediation owners. State what was not inspected or changed so the receipt cannot overclaim coverage.
| Condition | Response |
|---|---|
| Cross-tenant read succeeds | Disable the affected path and treat it as a security incident. |
| Credential appears in logs | Restrict access, rotate/revoke it, purge under policy, and repair redaction. |
| State validation is absent | Block OAuth completion until it is implemented. |
| Unsupported event contract is assumed | Remove the claim and redesign around supported reads or in-board events. |
The example is a redacted operator receipt; identifiers are hashes or bounded labels, not board content or credentials.
scopes=boards:read; state=verified; tokens=encrypted; tenant-negative-tests=passed; log-secrets=0; residual=2-low