---

name: cyber-detection-validation guardrail: true description: Validates defensive controls with paired authorized action and observation evidence, distinguishing blocked, prevented, detected, responded, and telemetry-gap outcomes. Use for purple-team validation design or offline fixture review; not unsanctioned testing or production efficacy claims. metadata: triggers: files: [] keywords: - purple team - detection validation - paired evidence - defensive validation - telemetry gap - control outcome

Cyber Detection Validation

Priority: P0 (CRITICAL)

No defensive outcome without linked action and observation evidence.

Structure

Input: control hypothesis, permitted action, scope/approval, entity, window, expected observation, stop condition. Process: verify runtime; capture action and observation records; link by test ID/entity/time/source; classify only from evidence. Output: outcome, evidence references, limitations, owner, framework edge.

Rules

• Active/modifying operations require engagement/scope, approved action, owner, and runtime-proven controls; independent approval is required for disruptive containment.
• Controlled synthetic/offline fixtures only. No real credentials, malware, live targets, or production modifications.
• blocked: action denied or could not run; prevented: control stopped action; detected: observation identified behavior; responded: independently evidenced approved response; telemetry-gap: action exists but required observation is absent/unusable.
• Detection is not response. A single log line or Markdown assertion cannot establish an outcome.
• Include scope reference; skill/version/source; observation time; finding status; action/observation evidence; limitations; owner; framework/version/ID/relation/rationale/source/review status. Reuse shared skill IDs.

Anti-Patterns

• Never label blocked as prevented or observation-only as detected.
• Never infer response from detection or claim efficacy/compliance from documentation.
• Never simulate a successful action when runtime or approval is absent.

References (lazy, primary)

• NIST SP 800-115 technical testing: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-115
• MITRE ATT&CK evaluations methodology: https://attackevals.mitre-engenuity.org/
• Reuse cyber-authorization, cyber-evidence, cyber-framework-mapping.