计划执行与检查节点
executing-plans
按既定实施计划完成工作,保持过程检查和反馈。
openevidence-security-basics【效率与协作】Apply OpenEvidence security best practices for HIPAA compliance and PHI protection. Use when securing API keys, implementing PHI handling, or auditing OpenEvidence security configuration. Trigger with phrases like "openevidence security", "openevidence hipaa", "openevidence phi", "secure openevidence", "openevidence compliance".
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Security best practices for OpenEvidence integrations handling Protected Health Information (PHI) in compliance with HIPAA regulations.
# .env (NEVER commit to git)
OPENEVIDENCE_API_KEY=oe_live_***
OPENEVIDENCE_ORG_ID=org_***
OPENEVIDENCE_WEBHOOK_SECRET=whsec_***
# .gitignore (REQUIRED)
.env
.env.local
.env.*.local
*.pem
*.key
credentials*.json
// src/config/secrets.ts
// Use secret manager in production (AWS Secrets Manager, GCP Secret Manager, HashiCorp Vault)
import { SecretManagerServiceClient } from '@google-cloud/secret-manager';
const client = new SecretManagerServiceClient();
export async function getOpenEvidenceCredentials(): Promise<{
apiKey: string;
orgId: string;
}> {
const [apiKeyVersion] = await client.accessSecretVersion({
name: 'projects/my-project/secrets/openevidence-api-key/versions/latest',
});
const [orgIdVersion] = await client.accessSecretVersion({
name: 'projects/my-project/secrets/openevidence-org-id/versions/latest',
});
return {
apiKey: apiKeyVersion.payload!.data!.toString(),
orgId: orgIdVersion.payload!.data!.toString(),
};
}
// src/openevidence/phi-handler.ts
// IMPORTANT: OpenEvidence should NOT receive direct PHI in queries
interface SanitizedQuery {
question: string;
context: {
ageRange?: string; // "65-74" not exact age
sex?: string;
conditionCategories?: string[]; // "cardiovascular" not specific diagnosis
};
}
export function sanitizeQueryForOpenEvidence(
question: string,
patientContext?: PatientContext
): SanitizedQuery {
// Remove any PHI that might have leaked into the question
let sanitized = question;
// Remove potential names
sanitized = sanitized.replace(/\b(Mr\.|Mrs\.|Ms\.|Dr\.)\s+[A-Z][a-z]+\b/g, '[PATIENT]');
// Remove dates of birth
sanitized = sanitized.replace(/\b\d{1,2}[\/\-]\d{1,2}[\/\-]\d{2,4}\b/g, '[DATE]');
// Remove MRNs
sanitized = sanitized.replace(/\bMRN[:\s]*\d+\b/gi, '[MRN]');
// Remove SSNs
sanitized = sanitized.replace(/\b\d{3}-\d{2}-\d{4}\b/g, '[SSN]');
return {
question: sanitized,
context: patientContext ? {
ageRange: getAgeRange(patientContext.age),
sex: patientContext.sex,
conditionCategories: categorizeConditions(patientContext.conditions),
} : undefined,
};
}
function getAgeRange(age?: number): string | undefined {
if (!age) return undefined;
if (age < 18) return 'pediatric';
if (age < 40) return '18-39';
if (age < 65) return '40-64';
if (age < 75) return '65-74';
return '75+';
}
function categorizeConditions(conditions?: string[]): string[] | undefined {
// Map specific conditions to categories
const categoryMap: Record<string, string> = {
'hypertension': 'cardiovascular',
'diabetes': 'endocrine',
'asthma': 'pulmonary',
// ... more mappings
};
return conditions?.map(c => categoryMap[c.toLowerCase()] || 'other');
}
// src/openevidence/audit-log.ts
interface AuditEntry {
timestamp: Date;
eventType: 'query' | 'deepconsult' | 'access' | 'export';
userId: string;
userRole: string;
action: string;
resourceType: 'clinical_answer' | 'research_report';
resourceId?: string;
ipAddress: string;
userAgent: string;
success: boolean;
errorCode?: string;
// Never log the actual query content or response - may contain PHI
}
export class HIPAAAuditLogger {
private logStore: AuditLogStore;
constructor(store: AuditLogStore) {
this.logStore = store;
}
async logClinicalQuery(
userId: string,
userRole: string,
queryId: string,
success: boolean,
request: Request
): Promise<void> {
await this.logStore.insert({
timestamp: new Date(),
eventType: 'query',
userId,
userRole,
action: 'clinical_query',
resourceType: 'clinical_answer',
resourceId: queryId,
ipAddress: this.getClientIP(request),
userAgent: request.headers.get('user-agent') || 'unknown',
success,
});
}
async logDeepConsult(
userId: string,
userRole: string,
consultId: string,
success: boolean,
request: Request
): Promise<void> {
await this.logStore.insert({
timestamp: new Date(),
eventType: 'deepconsult',
userId,
userRole,
action: 'research_synthesis',
resourceType: 'research_report',
resourceId: consultId,
ipAddress: this.getClientIP(request),
userAgent: request.headers.get('user-agent') || 'unknown',
success,
});
}
private getClientIP(request: Request): string {
// Handle proxies
const forwarded = request.headers.get('x-forwarded-for');
if (forwarded) return forwarded.split(',')[0].trim();
return 'unknown';
}
}
// src/openevidence/webhook-security.ts
import crypto from 'crypto';
export function verifyWebhookSignature(
payload: string | Buffer,
signature: string,
secret: string,
tolerance: number = 300 // 5 minute tolerance
): boolean {
// Parse signature header: t=timestamp,v1=signature
const parts = signature.split(',').reduce((acc, part) => {
const [key, value] = part.split('=');
acc[key] = value;
return acc;
}, {} as Record<string, string>);
const timestamp = parseInt(parts['t']);
const providedSignature = parts['v1'];
// Check timestamp to prevent replay attacks
const now = Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000);
if (Math.abs(now - timestamp) > tolerance) {
console.error('Webhook timestamp too old or in future');
return false;
}
// Compute expected signature
const signedPayload = `${timestamp}.${payload}`;
const expectedSignature = crypto
.createHmac('sha256', secret)
.update(signedPayload)
.digest('hex');
// Timing-safe comparison
try {
return crypto.timingSafeEqual(
Buffer.from(providedSignature),
Buffer.from(expectedSignature)
);
} catch {
return false;
}
}
// src/openevidence/data-retention.ts
// HIPAA requires minimum 6-year retention of access logs
interface RetentionPolicy {
auditLogs: number; // days
queryResults: number; // days
deepConsultReports: number; // days
}
const HIPAA_RETENTION: RetentionPolicy = {
auditLogs: 2190, // 6 years
queryResults: 0, // Do not store (re-query as needed)
deepConsultReports: 365, // 1 year (user can re-run)
};
export class DataRetentionManager {
constructor(private policy: RetentionPolicy = HIPAA_RETENTION) {}
async cleanupExpiredData(): Promise<CleanupReport> {
const cutoffs = {
auditLogs: new Date(Date.now() - this.policy.auditLogs * 24 * 60 * 60 * 1000),
deepConsultReports: new Date(Date.now() - this.policy.deepConsultReports * 24 * 60 * 60 * 1000),
};
// Note: Audit logs should be archived, not deleted
const archivedLogs = await db.auditLogs.archive({
where: { timestamp: { lt: cutoffs.auditLogs } },
});
const deletedReports = await db.deepConsultReports.deleteMany({
where: { createdAt: { lt: cutoffs.deepConsultReports } },
});
return {
auditLogsArchived: archivedLogs.count,
reportsDeleted: deletedReports.count,
executedAt: new Date(),
};
}
}
| Security Issue | Detection | Mitigation |
|---|---|---|
| Exposed API key | Git scanning alert | Rotate immediately, audit access |
| PHI in query | Log pattern matching | Block request, alert compliance |
| Failed signature | Webhook verification | Reject webhook, alert security |
| Unauthorized access | Audit log review | Revoke access, investigate |
const auditLogger = new HIPAAAuditLogger(auditStore);
export async function secureClinicaQuery(
question: string,
patientContext: PatientContext | undefined,
user: AuthenticatedUser,
request: Request
): Promise<ClinicalResponse> {
// 1. Sanitize input
const sanitized = sanitizeQueryForOpenEvidence(question, patientContext);
// 2. Make query
const response = await client.query({
question: sanitized.question,
context: {
specialty: 'internal-medicine',
urgency: 'routine',
...sanitized.context,
},
});
// 3. Audit log
await auditLogger.logClinicalQuery(
user.id,
user.role,
response.id,
true,
request
);
return response;
}
For production deployment, see openevidence-prod-checklist.