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name: deobfuscation description: "Binary deobfuscation, unpacking, and string recovery for protected native binaries (ELF, PE, Mach-O). Use this when encountering obfuscated, packed, or virtualized code — including VMProtect, Themida, Code Virtualizer, Arxan/Irdeto, custom protectors, or unknown obfuscation. Triggers: any mention of 'deobfuscation', 'obfuscated', 'packed binary', 'string encryption', 'code virtualization', 'anti-tamper', 'VMProtect', 'VMP', 'Themida', 'obfuscator', 'unpacking', encrypted sections, import obfuscation, or dynamic API resolution."

Binary Deobfuscation & Unpacking

Framework for identifying, analyzing, and defeating software protection schemes on native binaries. This skill provides the generic methodology; protector-specific techniques are in sub-skills.

Sub-Skills

Protector	Reference
VMProtect	vmprotect/SKILL.md — VMP 2.x/3.x detection, section dumping, string deobfuscation, devirtualization, anti-debug bypass

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1. General Workflow

1. Detect    → identify the protector and features used
2. Bypass    → neutralize anti-debug / anti-tamper
3. Unpack    → dump decrypted code sections at runtime
4. Recover   → extract strings, reconstruct imports
5. Analyze   → decompile / devirtualize recovered code

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2. Protector Identification

2.1 Quick Triage (radare2)

iS                    # unusual section names (.vmp0, .themida, .enigma, etc.)
iS~rwx                # RWX sections — strong packing indicator
ii | wc -l            # import count — very few = likely packed
iz | wc -l            # string count — very few = string encryption
ie                    # entry point — does it land in a non-.text section?
s entry0; pd 20       # entry point instructions — push/call/jmp patterns

2.2 Protector Signatures

Protector	Section Names	Entry Pattern	Key Imports	Other Indicators
VMProtect	.vmp0, .vmp1, .VMP	Jump into VMP section	dlsym/GetProcAddress only	VM dispatch loops, handler tables
Themida/WL	.themida, .winlice	pushad; call $+5	Kernel-level anti-debug	Driver-based protection
Code Virtualizer	.cv0, .cv1	Similar to VMP	Few imports	Oreans family (same vendor as Themida)
Arxan/Irdeto	Normal names	Guard pages, integrity checks	Normal imports	Checksum functions, code guards
UPX	UPX0, UPX1	Decompression stub	Normal (after unpack)	upx -d works for unmodified UPX
Custom	Varies	Varies	Often dlsym/mmap/mprotect	Manual analysis required

2.3 Android .so Specific Detection

On Android, native libraries protected with VMP or similar tools show:

readelf -S target.so | grep -iE 'vmp|themida|cv[0-9]'   # named sections
readelf -l target.so | grep RWE                           # RWX segments
readelf -d target.so | grep NEEDED                        # minimal dependencies

• RWX segments (PF_R | PF_W | PF_X) — legitimate .so files almost never need this
• JNI_OnLoad doing heavy work — protectors use JNI_OnLoad as the unpacking entry point
• mprotect storms at startup — the library calls mprotect repeatedly to make sections writable, unpack, then re-protect

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3. Generic Dynamic Techniques

These techniques work regardless of the protector. They hook at the API boundary rather than trying to reverse the obfuscation internals.

3.1 Module Fingerprinting (Android)

Identify the target .so by matching a known export at an expected offset:

function findTargetModule(exportName, expectedOffset) {
    for (const mod of Process.enumerateModules()) {
        const exp = mod.findExportByName(exportName);
        if (exp && exp.equals(mod.base.add(expectedOffset))) {
            return mod;
        }
    }
    return null;
}

This avoids name-based matching (which breaks when the library is renamed) and works even when the library hasn't been loaded yet when combined with a dlopen hook.

3.2 Library Load Detection

Wait for a target library to load at runtime:

function waitForLibrary(identifyFn, callback) {
    var found = identifyFn();
    if (found) { callback(found); return; }

    var dlopen = Module.getGlobalExportByName('android_dlopen_ext')
        ?? Module.getGlobalExportByName('dlopen');

    Interceptor.attach(dlopen, {
        onLeave() {
            if (found) return;
            found = identifyFn();
            if (found) callback(found);
        }
    });
}

3.3 mprotect Monitoring

Track memory permission changes to understand the unpacking sequence:

function hookMprotect(targetModule) {
    var log = [];
    Interceptor.attach(Module.getGlobalExportByName('mprotect'), {
        onEnter(args) {
            this.addr = args[0];
            this.len  = args[1].toUInt32();
            this.prot = args[2].toInt32();
        },
        onLeave(retval) {
            if (retval.toInt32() !== 0) return;

            var start = this.addr;
            var end   = start.add(this.len);
            var modStart = targetModule.base;
            var modEnd   = modStart.add(targetModule.size);
            if (start.compare(modEnd) >= 0 || end.compare(modStart) <= 0) return;

            var prot = '';
            if (this.prot & 1) prot += 'r';
            if (this.prot & 2) prot += 'w';
            if (this.prot & 4) prot += 'x';
            log.push({ addr: start.toString(), len: this.len, prot: prot || 'none' });
            console.log('[mprotect] ' + start + ' len=0x' + this.len.toString(16) + ' ' + prot);
        }
    });
    return log;
}

Typical protector sequence: r-x → rwx (unpack) → r-x (re-protect). A section that becomes rwx and then goes back to r-x has just been unpacked — dump it at the transition.

3.4 Section Dumping via Frida

Dump a decrypted section after the protector finishes unpacking:

function dumpSection(mod, offset, size, reason) {
    var addr = mod.base.add(offset);
    var bytes = addr.readByteArray(size);
    send({
        type: 'dump',
        module: mod.name,
        base: mod.base.toString(),
        section_addr: addr.toString(),
        size: size,
        reason: reason
    }, bytes);
    console.log('[+] Dumped 0x' + size.toString(16) + ' bytes @ ' + addr + ' (' + reason + ')');
}

3.5 API-Level String Capture

Instead of reversing the string decryption algorithm, hook the functions that consume decrypted strings. This works for any protector because decrypted strings must eventually pass through standard APIs.

Target functions by category:

Category	Functions	What they reveal
libc string	strcmp, strncmp, strstr, strlen, snprintf, sprintf	General strings used by the protected code
Dynamic linking	dlsym, dlopen	Dynamically resolved API names and libraries
JNI (Android)	NewStringUTF, GetStringUTFChars, FindClass, GetMethodID, GetFieldID, RegisterNatives	Java-native boundary: class names, method names, field names
Logging	__android_log_print, __android_log_write, NSLog	Debug/status messages
File I/O	fopen, open, access	File paths accessed by the protected code

Return-address filtering — only log calls originating from the target module to reduce noise:

function isFromTarget(returnAddr) {
    return returnAddr.compare(targetBase) >= 0 &&
           returnAddr.compare(targetEnd) < 0;
}

Interceptor.attach(Module.getGlobalExportByName('strcmp'), {
    onEnter(args) {
        if (!isFromTarget(this.returnAddress)) return;
        this.log = true;
        this.s1 = args[0].readCString();
        this.s2 = args[1].readCString();
    },
    onLeave() {
        if (!this.log) return;
        if (this.s1) console.log('[strcmp] ' + this.s1);
        if (this.s2) console.log('[strcmp] ' + this.s2);
    }
});

3.6 Deduplication

When hooking high-frequency functions, deduplicate to avoid log noise:

var seen = {};
var seenCount = 0;
var MAX_SEEN = 50000;

function isDuplicate(source, str) {
    var key = source + '|' + str;
    if (seen[key]) return true;
    if (seenCount < MAX_SEEN) {
        seen[key] = 1;
        seenCount++;
    }
    return false;
}

function logString(source, str, extra) {
    if (!str || str.length === 0 || str.length > 4096) return;
    if (isDuplicate(source, str)) return;
    send({ type: 'string', source: source, value: str, extra: extra || '' });
}

3.7 Python Host Script Pattern

Capture agent output and write categorized results:

import frida, sys, signal, time

strings_by_source = {}

def on_message(message, data):
    if message["type"] == "send":
        payload = message["payload"]
        if isinstance(payload, dict) and payload.get("type") == "string":
            source = payload.get("source", "unknown")
            value = payload.get("value", "")
            strings_by_source.setdefault(source, []).append(value)
            print(f"[{source}] {value}")
        elif isinstance(payload, dict) and payload.get("type") == "dump":
            with open(f"dump_{payload['reason']}.bin", "wb") as f:
                f.write(data)
            print(f"[dump] {payload['size']} bytes saved")

device = frida.get_device_manager().add_remote_device("127.0.0.1:27042")
pid = device.spawn(["com.example.app"])
session = device.attach(pid)
script = session.create_script(open("agent.js").read())
script.on("message", on_message)
script.load()
device.resume(pid)

signal.signal(signal.SIGINT, lambda *_: sys.exit(0))
while True: time.sleep(1)

3.8 uncompress / zlib Monitoring

Many protectors (including VMProtect) use zlib to decompress packed code at runtime:

var uncompress = Module.getGlobalExportByName('uncompress');
if (uncompress) {
    Interceptor.attach(uncompress, {
        onEnter(args) {
            this.dest    = args[0];
            this.destLen = args[1];
            this.srcLen  = args[3].toUInt32();
        },
        onLeave(retval) {
            if (retval.toInt32() !== 0) return;
            var outLen = this.destLen.readU32();
            console.log('[uncompress] ' + this.srcLen + ' -> ' + outLen + ' bytes @ ' + this.dest);
        }
    });
}

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4. Tips

• Hook consumers, not decryptors. Reversing the decryption algorithm is hard and protector-specific. Hooking the APIs that receive decrypted data (strcmp, JNI, dlsym) is protector-agnostic and much faster.
• Filter by return address. Without filtering, libc hooks produce thousands of irrelevant hits from system libraries. Check this.returnAddress against the target module range.
• Dump after JNI_OnLoad (Android). For protected Android .so files, the unpacking is typically complete by the time JNI_OnLoad is called. Hook it and dump sections from onEnter.
• Track mprotect to understand unpacking. The sequence of mprotect calls reveals which sections are being unpacked and when. This tells you the right moment to dump.
• Use fingerprinting, not names. Identify target modules by matching exports at known offsets, not by library name (which can change between builds).