executing-plans
executing-plans
Use when executing an implementation plan in the current session as the implementer yourself — your human partner chose inline execution, or no subagent tool is available
foundations-behavioral-economics16 evidence-graded behavioral-economics primitives. Use when asking will this nudge work, is a pricing decoy or dark pattern lawful, or what effect size to expect.
Independent GitHub snapshot · Automated classification · Original documentation governs
Read each primitive's misuse boundary before applying it. The disclosure test is an ethical screen, not a legal definition: a technique that embarrasses the team on disclosure needs redesign even if it is lawful.
Apply behavioral-economics when:
Skip and use simpler alternatives when:
Each primitive has a full playbook: Definition / When to use / Misuse boundary / Inputs / Outputs / Failure modes / Worked example / Sources. Grades are explained in Expert Judgment.
| # | Primitive | Core Effect | When to Use | Grade |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Prospect Theory | Gains and losses are not mirror images; framing shifts choice | Pricing copy, offer framing, upgrade messaging | A (direction) |
| 2 | Loss Aversion | Loss framing can shift choices; magnitude varies by task, stakes, and elicitation method | Churn prevention, trial expiry, feature removal messaging | B |
| 3 | Anchoring | First number shown distorts all subsequent judgments | Pricing pages, salary negotiation, discount presentation | A (direction) |
| 4 | Defaults | People disproportionately stick with pre-set options | Onboarding, opt-in/out choices, plan pre-selection | A for enrolment-type, low-effort choices; B elsewhere. Organ donation is not an A case: in a 2025 PNAS Nexus panel of opt-out switches, deceased-donor rates rose a non-significant +7% and living-donor rates fell 29% (crowding out). Pooled evidence undecided after correction — see nudge-calibration.md |
| 5 | Social Proof | People infer correct action from others' behavior | Sign-up pages, review placement, usage statistics | B |
| 6 | Scarcity | Limited availability increases perceived value | Inventory counts, time-limited offers, waitlists | B |
| 7 | Hyperbolic Discounting | Present bias: immediate rewards are disproportionately preferred | Free trials, commitment devices, annual vs monthly pricing | A (direction) |
| 8 | Mental Accounting | People categorize money differently depending on source and label | Bundling, gift cards, credit framing, sunk-cost effects | B |
| 9 | Choice Architecture | How choices are presented alters which option is selected | Option ordering, menu design, default pre-selection | C for "choice overload" specifically (mean effect ≈0, Scheibehenne et al. 2010); B for ordering/default effects generally |
| 10 | Dual-System Cognition | Two cognitive modes with different speed/effort profiles influence which levers work | Copy tone, complexity of CTA, trust signals | B — a descriptive heuristic, not a literal neural dichotomy |
| 11 | Decoy Effect / Asymmetric Dominance | A dominated option shifts preference toward its dominator | Pricing tier design, plan comparison tables | C — fragile outside stylized numeric stimuli (Frederick, Lee & Baskin 2014; Yang & Lynn 2014: 11/91 reliable) |
| 12 | Habit Loop | Stable cue → routine → reward becomes automatic with repetition | Daily/recurring usage, retention beyond week 4, durable behavior change | A (direction); no fixed weeks-to-automaticity number — see the fixed-weeks trap below |
| 13 | Reinforcement Schedules | Schedule (FR/VR/FI/VI), not just reward, governs acquisition and resistance to extinction | Streaks, rewards, gamification, reactivation; auditing existing reward systems | B |
| 14 | Cognitive Load & Working Memory | Working memory holds ~4 novel chunks; extraneous load suppresses informed choice | Forms, dashboards, alerts, error displays, consent flows, onboarding step count | A |
| 15 | Context-Dependent Retrieval | Behaviors are bound to the cues present at encoding; performance can weaken when context shifts | Migrations, redesigns, cross-surface continuity, dormant-user reactivation | B — direction reliable in meta-analysis (Smith & Vela 2001), moderated by "outshining" from non-contextual cues; the flagship Godden & Baddeley-style replication failed (Murre 2021 + 2022 addendum) |
| 16 | Implementation Intentions | User-endorsed if-then plans bind a specific cue to a specific response, supporting goal completion | Goal-pursuit features, onboarding into habit-forming behavior, transition-state re-anchoring | B — outcome-specific effects; publication-bias adjustment reduces the overall estimate (Sheeran et al. 2024; see evidence notes below) |
Failure modes addressed, one line each: #1/#2 treating gains and losses as symmetric; #3 letting the user anchor on a competitor's number; #4 opt-in flows that require active effort; #5 empty/invisible proof signals; #6 no urgency signal; #7 annual plans losing to a monthly default; #8 lump-sum pricing hiding true perceived size; #9 option overload or unguided menus; #10 System-2 copy aimed at a System-1 decision; #11 two-option pricing with no reference point; #12 attributing retention decline to "habit" without cue-conditional evidence; #13 a reward system that worked at launch then went dead; #14 mid-flow abandonment from working-memory overload; #15 a redesign silently breaking the cue that triggered a behavior; #16 generic reminders standing in for an authored if-then plan.
Use references/formal-theory-map.md when the task needs source assumptions, ethical boundaries, or a distinction between observed behavior and normative decision quality.
Canonical references: Kahneman & Tversky 1979 (prospect theory), Kahneman 2011 (dual-system), Thaler & Sunstein 2008 (nudge/choice architecture), Ariely 2008 (illustrative — anchoring, decoy, mental accounting; treat as a trade-book demonstration, not primary evidence), Cialdini 1984 (social proof, scarcity), Loewenstein & Prelec 1991 (mental accounting), Frederick, Loewenstein & O'Donoghue 2002 (time preferences), Wood & Rünger 2016 + Lally et al. 2010 (habit loop, time-to-automaticity), Ferster & Skinner 1957 + Schultz 1997 (reinforcement schedules), Miller 1956 + Cowan 2001 + Sweller et al. 2019 (working memory, cognitive load), Tulving & Thomson 1973 + Wood, Tam & Witt 2005 (encoding specificity, context-dependent habits), Gollwitzer & Sheeran 2006 (implementation intentions meta-analysis, updated by Sheeran, Listrom & Gollwitzer 2024). Numeric effect sizes are from primary papers; domain-specific applications may differ — always measure on your own population before treating published coefficients as guarantees.
A nudge is legitimate if it: (1) steers people toward choices they would endorse on reflection; (2) can be easily overridden or opted out of; (3) does not exploit cognitive limitations to work against the user's interests.
A dark pattern fails one or more of these. The same psychological lever — scarcity, defaults, loss framing — can be a nudge or a dark pattern depending on whether the underlying offer is good for the user.
| Dimension | Nudge | Dark Pattern |
|---|---|---|
| Transparency | Can be disclosed without changing its effect | Requires concealment to work |
| User benefit | Steers toward user's own goals | Overrides user's goals in favor of operator's |
| Reversibility | Easy to undo or override | Designed to make undoing difficult |
| Honest signal | Scarcity / proof / urgency is real | Signal is fabricated |
| Regulatory posture | Survives ASA/FTC/CMA scrutiny | Attracts regulatory action |
Every primitive carries a "Misuse boundary" stating its specific manipulation risk and the required condition for ethical use — non-negotiable gates, not optional guidelines.
When LLMs or AI agents make decisions on behalf of users (shopping, booking, form completion), choice-architecture manipulations apply to the agent, not the human — and with dramatically larger effect sizes. Under a default-option nudge, most tested LLMs shifted their choices far more than humans did, though a few models stayed close to human sensitivity. The pattern held for suggested alternatives and information highlighting too (Cherep, Maes & Singh, "AI agents are sensitive to nudges," PNAS 123(25), 2026, DOI 10.1073/pnas.2537030123; preprint arXiv:2505.11584). Standard remediation (chain-of-thought prompting, in-context human examples) shifts the distribution but does not reliably resolve this sensitivity; reasoning-optimized models partially restore human-level sensitivity, but inconsistently and at substantial inference cost — treat per-model susceptibility as something to test directly, not a property newer models resolve for free.
Awareness does not confer resistance. A separate 2025 study of LLM-powered GUI agents across 16 dark-pattern types (Tang et al., arXiv:2509.10723) found agents frequently fail to recognize manipulative interfaces at all, and — critically — even when they do recognize one, they prioritize task completion over protective action. Human oversight improved avoidance but added attentional tunneling and supervisor load, so human-in-the-loop is a mitigation with a price, not a solution. Design implication: agent-facing guardrails must be structural (constrained action scope, explicit confirmation gates on irreversible steps) — detection prompts alone do not change agent behavior.
Conversational dark patterns are a distinct surface: manipulation enacted in dialogue rather than layout — exaggerated agreement (sycophancy), biased framing of options, privacy-intrusive probing. Users detect these through conversational signals but frequently accept them as normal helpfulness (Shi et al., "The Siren Song of LLMs," CHI 2026; arXiv:2509.10830). If your product ships an LLM interface, the harm test applies to generated turns, not just to screens.
AI as a persuasion source (distinct from AI as a nudge target, above): as reported in Salvi et al. 2025 (Nature Human Behaviour, DOI 10.1038/s41562-025-02194-6), GPT-4 with access to a debate opponent's demographics had 81.2% higher odds of higher post-debate agreement than the Human–Human baseline (Abstract), an odds comparison rather than a completion-rate multiplier. A later Author Correction reportedly changed the personalised-vs-non-personalised comparison (unsourced — verify before citing); until checked, do not claim that personalisation specifically adds persuasion. Separately, Hackenburg et al. 2025 ("The levers of political persuasion with conversational artificial intelligence," Science 390, DOI 10.1126/science.aea3884; three experiments) found post-training and prompting raised persuasiveness more than personalisation or scale did, and that where persuasiveness rose, factual accuracy fell (magnitudes not re-verified). That accuracy trade-off is the concrete harm test for an AI sales or support agent: measure factual accuracy alongside persuasion, not persuasion alone. There is no established method here for auditing agent-as-persuader risk beyond ad hoc accuracy checks; treat this as an open gap.
When AI/ML systems deliver nudges (recommendation engines, personalisation, chatbots): (1) disclose the targeting model as an autonomy safeguard, not a general duty; (2) algorithmic personalisation can amplify heterogeneous treatment effects, raising equity concerns when it disproportionately steers vulnerable segments; (3) primitives #4, #9, #10 that produce small average effects in static designs can produce much larger effects when a personalisation model is tuned to exploit individual susceptibility. Apply the standard harm test to the targeting logic, not just the surface.
Before a legality claim about pricing, defaults, cancellation, or AI manipulation, read references/regulatory-context.md. Follow its official-law and regulator links to check territorial scope, current amended text, rule status, and application dates; cached enforcement examples do not establish the governing obligation. Qualified counsel determines the legal conclusion.
A non-expert treats every named effect the same way — "behavioral economics says X, so X is true." An expert grades each effect by replication status, sample, and design before recommending it. Behavioral economics has an unusually high rate of famous, textbook-cited findings that later failed to replicate or were built on fabricated data (ego depletion, social priming/"elderly walk," the Ariely–Gino "sign-at-top" honesty studies retracted in 2021, power-posing's hormonal claims). None of those are load-bearing evidence in this skill's primitives — but the discipline expects you to ask the same question of every claim brought in from outside it.
Grade legend: A = replicates across labs, populations, elicitation methods; direction reliable even where magnitude varies. B = direction replicates but the coefficient swings ≥2× by design, population, or stimulus. C = frequently invoked in product folklore, but the pooled/meta-analytic estimate is near zero or the mechanism is disputed — do not drive a design decision on a C-grade effect without a local pilot. Grades per primitive are in the Quick Reference table above; do not treat "A" as license to skip local measurement, and do not treat "B" as license to quote a specific number (λ, d) to a stakeholder as a forecast.
Famous but not credible as evidence — do not import even if asked by name: ego depletion as a standalone effect, social/behavioral priming (Bargh-style), power posing. Contested, not settled: scarcity-mindset-as-cognitive-tax (failed Colombia replication, null registered report); do not use it as a design driver. If asked, explain the replication failure rather than silently complying.
Nudge calibration and sample-size arithmetic (Maier 2022, DellaVigna & Linos 2022, Szaszi 2022 — replacing a single low-quality second-order synthesis as the primary calibration layer): references/nudge-calibration.md. Read this before promising a board a forecast lift or sizing a test.
Loss aversion coefficient: Brown, Imai, Vieider & Camerer, JEL 62(2), 2024 (607 estimates, 150 papers) places mean λ at 1.955 [1.820, 2.102]; Walasek, Mullett & Stewart, J. Econ. Psych. 103, 2024 (risky choice) at 1.31 [1.10, 1.53]. The canonical λ ≈ 2.25 (Tversky & Kahneman 1992) is a historical task-specific estimate, not a population bound or copy-response multiplier — never use it as a lift multiplier on copy or forecasts. A 2025 re-meta-analysis of the Brown et al. dataset (84 papers, 163 estimates, N=149,218) finds λ ≈ 1.07 (non-significant) for symmetric unordered gain-loss designs.
Nudge effect sizes at scale: see references/nudge-calibration.md for the full calibration set (Maier, DellaVigna & Linos, Szaszi, Hu). Do not treat any single published nudge effect size as a deployment guarantee.
Implementation intentions: Sheeran, Listrom & Gollwitzer 2024 — the author manuscript, p. 4, reports d = 0.27 for behavior and d = 0.66 for affect, not a format/rehearsal range. Its 642-test overall estimate is d = 0.36, reduced to d = 0.15 [0.08, 0.22] by Robust Bayesian Meta-Analysis adjusting for publication bias. Format, motivation, and rehearsal moderate effects; none is a product-lift guarantee.
WEIRD-sample generalization limits: the primary literature underlying most of these primitives (Kahneman & Tversky's original studies, classroom-recruited replications, Prolific/MTurk convenience samples) draws overwhelmingly from Western, Educated, Industrialized, Rich, Democratic populations. Effect direction travels reasonably well across cultures; effect magnitude does not — collectivist vs individualist framing changes social-proof and loss-aversion magnitudes, financial literacy changes anchoring susceptibility. Treat a published coefficient as a hypothesis to test locally before applying it to a non-US/UK, non-English-speaking, or non-online-panel population.
When a nudge backfires — recognize these before shipping, not after:
One merged table. Every primitive's "Misuse boundary" subsection restates its own row in more detail — read that before applying the primitive.
| Pattern | Diagnosis | Required Fix |
|---|---|---|
| Fabricated scarcity or social proof | The lever works by deception, not better choice architecture | Use only verifiable constraints and real cohort data; specific numbers ("50 teams") beat vague claims |
| Hidden opt-out or cancellation | Defaults become coercive when exit is costly | Make override and reversal as easy as entry (#4) |
| Loss framing on trivial events | Manufactures anxiety where no real value is at stake | Reserve loss framing for decisions where real value is genuinely at stake (#2) |
| Anchoring with no informational value | The anchor distorts without informing | Anchor with plausible, comparable, explained values (#3) |
| Decoy used to push overbuying or mislead | A dominated option can manipulate plan choice; the mechanism is fragile outside numeric-attribute contexts (Grade C) | Ensure the target is genuinely best for the modal user; use the corrected asymmetric-dominance definition and fragility caveat in the decoy template (#11) |
| Choice overload used to justify option-cutting | Meta-analytic mean choice-overload effect ≈0 across 63 conditions (Scheibehenne, Greifeneder & Todd, JCR 2010, N=5,036); real only under specific moderators | Treat option reduction as a testable hypothesis; measure abandonment with N vs N−3 options before attributing drop-off to overload (#9) |
| Treating lab effect sizes, or any single published coefficient, as a production guarantee | Nudge effects shrink under publication-bias correction and in government at-scale deployments (see nudge-calibration.md) | Always measure on your own population; use published effects as priors, not forecasts (#4, #9) |
| Assuming loss aversion is a universal 2× constant | λ is design-dependent; the constants and their sources live in the Loss aversion coefficient paragraph above (the single home) | Always measure on your own population and design; do not apply λ as a fixed multiplier to any copy or forecast number (#2) |
| Variable-ratio schedules on non-essential or compulsion-prone actions | Maximises engagement by exploiting prediction error, not by serving the user's goal | Default to fixed schedules; rate-cap any VR component; require explicit harm-test sign-off (#13) |
| Streak counters standing in for the whole habit design | Substitute reward — counter inflation rather than the user's real outcome; collapses on a missed day | Bind the routine's reward to a real user-visible outcome; treat the streak as instrumentation, not the reward (#12, #13) |
| Engineering habits for behaviors the user did not endorse | Cue→routine→reward design used to drive metrics, not user-stated goals | Bind habits to user-acknowledged goals; make cues legible and disable-able (#12) |
| Fixed "N weeks to form a habit" claims | Time-to-automaticity is highly variable (Lally et al.: 18–254 days to 95% of asymptote, 96 volunteers) — no fixed week count generalises | Instrument the cue-conditional completion rate per cohort week instead of committing to a weeks-to-habit number (#12) |
| Material decisions buried under cumulative cognitive load | Late-flow decisions may undermine informed choice; consent validity depends on the full interaction context | Move material decisions to early/low-load positions; strip extraneous load (#14) |
| Major redesign shipped with no cue audit | Behavior weakens when the icon, entry path, or layout cues that triggered it move — moderated by "outshining" from other in-product cues | Catalogue cues per load-bearing behavior pre-redesign; preserve the dominant cue across ≥1 full retention cycle (#15) |
| Generic reminders substituted for implementation intentions | "Don't forget to review" is not a plan — no cue→response binding, no rehearsal | Replace with user-authored if-then ("When [cue], I will [response]"); require confirmation, not pre-fill (#16) |
| Reactivating dormant users on an untested cue | The prior cue may have lost relevance or accessibility; dormancy alone does not establish extinction | Test whether the cue still works; offer re-onboarding when it fails, using a threshold matched to the product's use cycle (#12, #15) |
| Underestimating trivial friction in high-value flows | As reported in Grieder et al., Results: 91.7% orders with consultant ordering vs. 51.7% with self-service ordering among 173 Swiss SMEs | Audit ordering friction, then measure local uptake; this field contrast is not a universal per-step halving rule (#9, #14) |
| Telling an AI agent to "avoid dark patterns" and calling it mitigated | Agents that recognise a manipulative interface still prioritise task completion over protective action — detection is not resistance (Tang et al. 2025) | Constrain structurally: narrow action scope, hard confirmation gates on irreversible/spend steps, spend ceiling |
| "Neuroscience-based" retention claim with no named mechanism | Marketing veneer — habit loops dressed up as neuroscience without specifying cue, schedule, or capacity | Force every retention claim to name the primitive: cue (#12), schedule (#13), capacity (#14), cue stability (#15), or planned action (#16) |
| Picking a winner without comparative confirmation | Selecting the largest noisy estimate can exaggerate its effect under either sequential or simultaneous testing | When delivery is scalable and arms can be powered, compare several interventions against a common control and shared outcome; adjust for multiple comparisons and confirm the selected winner (megastudy approach; Duckworth & Milkman, PNAS Nexus 2022) |
| Business model whose margin IS the bias | The primitive is the revenue line, not a retention technique. Revenue concentration rising in the top decile is a leading indicator of both whale churn and duty-of-care exposure | Track share of revenue from users whose spend exceeds plausible disposable income as a risk metric; see references/patterns-scenarios-traps.md § Edge-over-appetite business models |
Check references/patterns-scenarios-traps.md before applying primitives to production user flows.
Read references/composition-recipes.md for pricing, onboarding, churn, retention, or migration stacks.
Goal: build onboarding flows, pricing pages, and conversational UX for AI-assistant / AI-agent products without crossing into manipulation or EU AI Act Art. 5 violations.
Context: Test human-facing choice architecture and the specific AI agent acting on it separately; susceptibility differs by model (see AI Agents as Decision Subjects).
Stack — for the human-facing UX:
Stack — for the AI agent acting on behalf of users: 5. Choice architecture audit (#4, #9): Before deploying an AI agent in any choice-architecture-heavy environment (marketplaces, booking flows, multi-vendor pricing), run behavioral tests against the nudges present, per model — susceptibility is model-specific, not universal. 6. Structural guardrails over detection prompts: Do not rely on instructing the agent to "watch for manipulative interfaces" — detection is not resistance. Constrain what the agent can do: narrow action scope, hard confirmation gates on irreversible or spend-incurring steps, a spend/commitment ceiling the agent cannot exceed without the user. 7. Human oversight, costed honestly: Oversight improves avoidance but adds attentional tunneling and supervisor load. Escalate selectively on irreversible actions — a review surface the user stops reading is not oversight. 8. Transparency disclosure: explain relevant highlighting/default mechanisms to the user as an autonomy safeguard. Article 5 is a prohibition with specific conditions, not a general duty to disclose every nudge. Assess applicable legal notices separately with qualified counsel.
Ethical-bound check: (1) Is the default AI action scope the least-surprise, least-invasive option? (2) Can the user find and operate the scope controls without assistance? (3) Is the AI's behavior disclosure legible without reading a privacy policy? (4) Is factual accuracy checked whenever a persuasive generated turn is shipped (see AI as a persuasion source)?
Fail signal: high initial activation but user complaints of "the AI did something I didn't expect" — the agent's autonomy scope default was set too wide; cognitive load at consent was too high for informed choice.
Inputs: AI feature list with autonomy scope per feature (read / suggest / act), default state per feature (on/off), cognitive load estimate of consent/scope-setting flow (steps × decision complexity), target user's technical familiarity level. Rules: Default autonomous actions to off or narrowest scope unless user has explicitly expanded; material scope decisions shown before permission is granted, with comprehension tested in the actual flow; social proof claims must cite verifiable data; agent deployment in third-party environments requires a nudge-susceptibility audit before launch; irreversible and spend-incurring agent actions require a hard confirmation gate. Outputs: Default state table per AI feature (on/off, scope level, reversibility) + consent flow redesign with cognitive load score per step + nudge-susceptibility checklist for any third-party environment the agent operates in + EU AI Act Art. 5 issue list for counsel review.
data/sources.jsonConsumer applied recipe layers that use these primitives link here.
marketing-cro — conversion rate optimization applied recipesstartup-business-models — pricing and packaging applied recipesmarketing-content-strategy — copy and messaging applied recipesproduct-management — onboarding and feature adoption applied recipesmarketing-paid-advertising — ad copy and landing page applied recipesWhen prior decisions or pitfalls are relevant, consult learnings.consolidated.md if present; use learnings.md only for needed history or as the available fallback. Otherwise skip both.
After applying it, if you encountered a pattern worth remembering, a mistake worth preventing, or a domain fact that surprised you, append one dated bullet to learnings.md via agents-skills-feedback-loop/scripts/append_learning.py. Do not modify SKILL.md itself.