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security-audit-codebase

security-audit-codebase

Security audit codebase → exposed secrets, vulnerable deps, injection vulns, insecure configs, OWASP Top 10. Use → pre-publish|deploy, periodic security review, post-auth|API integ added, pre-OSS private repo, prep security compliance audit.

Independent GitHub snapshot · Automated classification · Original documentation governs

Documentation de la Skill

GitHub

name: security-audit-codebase locale: caveman-ultra source_locale: en source_commit: 82c77053 fence_basis_commit: 82c77053 translator: "Julius Brussee homage — caveman" translation_date: "2026-05-03" description: > Security audit codebase → exposed secrets, vulnerable deps, injection vulns, insecure configs, OWASP Top 10. Use → pre-publish|deploy, periodic security review, post-auth|API integ added, pre-OSS private repo, prep security compliance audit. license: MIT allowed-tools: Read Write Edit Bash Grep Glob metadata: author: Philipp Thoss version: "1.0" domain: general complexity: intermediate language: multi tags: security, audit, owasp, secrets, vulnerability

Security Audit Codebase

Systematic security review → ID vulns + exposed secrets.

Use When

  • Pre-publish|deploy
  • Periodic review
  • Post-auth|API integ|input handling
  • Pre-OSS private repo
  • Prep compliance audit

In

  • Required: Codebase
  • Optional: Focus area (secrets|deps|injection|auth)
  • Optional: Compliance frame (OWASP|ISO 27001|SOC 2)
  • Optional: Prev findings for compare

Do

Step 1: Scan Exposed Secrets

# API keys and tokens
grep -rn "sk-\|ghp_\|gho_\|github_pat_\|hf_\|AKIA" --include="*.{md,js,ts,py,R,json,yml,yaml}" .

# Generic secret patterns
grep -rn "password\s*=\s*['\"]" --include="*.{js,ts,py,R,json}" .
grep -rn "api[_-]key\s*[=:]\s*['\"]" --include="*.{js,ts,py,R,json}" .
grep -rn "secret\s*[=:]\s*['\"]" --include="*.{js,ts,py,R,json}" .

# Connection strings
grep -rn "postgresql://\|mysql://\|mongodb://" .

# Private keys
grep -rn "BEGIN.*PRIVATE KEY" .

→ No real secrets — only placeholders (YOUR_TOKEN_HERE, your.email@example.com).

If err: real secret found → remove + rotate cred + clean git history (git filter-branch|git-filter-repo). Treat exposed = compromised.

Step 2: .gitignore Coverage

# Check that these are git-ignored
git check-ignore .env .Renviron credentials.json node_modules/

# Look for tracked sensitive files
git ls-files | grep -i "\.env\|\.renviron\|credentials\|secret"

→ Sensitive (.env, .Renviron, credentials.json) in .gitignore, git ls-files returns no tracked sensitive.

If err: tracked → git rm --cached <file>, add .gitignore, commit. File stays disk but no longer versioned.

Step 3: Audit Deps

Node.js:

npm audit
npx audit-ci --moderate

Python:

pip-audit
safety check

R:

# Check for known vulnerabilities in packages
# No built-in tool, but verify package sources
renv::status()

→ No high|critical vulns. Mod+low documented.

If err: critical → update via npm audit fix|pip install --upgrade. Breaking changes → document + remediation plan.

Step 4: Injection Vulns

SQL Injection:

# Look for string concatenation in queries
grep -rn "paste.*SELECT\|paste.*INSERT\|paste.*UPDATE\|paste.*DELETE" --include="*.R" .
grep -rn "query.*\+.*\|query.*\$\{" --include="*.{js,ts}" .

All queries → parameterized, not string concat.

Command Injection:

# Look for shell execution with user input
grep -rn "system\(.*paste\|exec(\|spawn(" --include="*.{R,js,ts,py}" .

XSS:

# Look for unescaped user content in HTML
grep -rn "innerHTML\|dangerouslySetInnerHTML\|v-html" --include="*.{js,ts,jsx,tsx,vue}" .

→ No SQL|command|XSS vectors. Queries parameterized, shell avoids user input, HTML escaped.

If err: vulns found → replace string concat → parameterized, sanitize|escape user input pre-shell, framework-safe rendering not innerHTML|dangerouslySetInnerHTML.

Step 5: Auth + AuthZ Review

Checklist:

  • Pwds hashed bcrypt|argon2 (not MD5|SHA1)
  • Session tokens random + long
  • Auth tokens have expiration
  • API endpoints check authz
  • CORS restrictive
  • CSRF protection for state-changing ops

→ All pass: pwds strong hash, tokens random+expire, endpoints enforce authz, CORS restrictive, CSRF active.

If err: prioritize by severity — weak hash + missing authz = critical; CORS+CSRF = high. Document w/ severity.

Step 6: Config Security

# Debug mode in production configs
grep -rn "debug\s*[=:]\s*[Tt]rue\|DEBUG\s*=\s*1" --include="*.{json,yml,yaml,toml,cfg}" .

# Permissive CORS
grep -rn "Access-Control-Allow-Origin.*\*\|cors.*origin.*\*" --include="*.{js,ts}" .

# HTTP instead of HTTPS
grep -rn "http://" --include="*.{js,ts,py,R}" . | grep -v "localhost\|127.0.0.1\|http://"

→ Debug off prod, no wildcard CORS prod, all external HTTPS.

If err: debug prod → disable. Wildcard CORS → explicit allowed domains. http:// → https:// where supported.

Step 7: Document Findings

# Security Audit Report

**Date**: YYYY-MM-DD
**Auditor**: [Name]
**Scope**: [Repository/Project]
**Status**: [PASS/FAIL/CONDITIONAL]

## Findings Summary

| Category | Status | Details |
|----------|--------|---------|
| Exposed secrets | PASS | No secrets found |
| .gitignore | PASS | Sensitive files excluded |
| Dependencies | WARN | 2 moderate vulnerabilities |
| Injection | PASS | Parameterized queries used |
| Auth/AuthZ | N/A | No authentication in scope |
| Configuration | PASS | Debug mode disabled |

## Detailed Findings

### Finding 1: [Title]
- **Severity**: Low / Medium / High / Critical
- **Location**: `path/to/file:line`
- **Description**: What was found
- **Recommendation**: How to fix
- **Status**: Open / Resolved

## Recommendations
1. Update dependencies to fix moderate vulnerabilities
2. [Additional recommendations]

→ SECURITY_AUDIT_REPORT.md in project root w/ findings categorized by severity, location, desc, recommendation.

If err: too many findings → group by category + prioritize critical|high. Generate regardless to baseline.

Check

  • No hardcoded secrets
  • .gitignore covers sensitive
  • No high|critical dep vulns
  • No injection vulns
  • Auth properly impl (if applicable)
  • Audit report complete + findings addressed

Traps

  • Only check current files: Secrets in git history still exposed. git log -p --all -S 'secret_pattern'.
  • Ignore dev deps: Dev deps still introduce supply chain risk.
  • False sense from .gitignore: Only prevents future tracking. Already-committed → git rm --cached.
  • Overlook configs: docker-compose.yml, CI configs, deploy scripts often have secrets.
  • No rotate compromised: Finding+removing not enough. Cred must be revoked + regenerated.

→

  • configure-git-repository — proper .gitignore setup
  • write-claude-md — document security reqs
  • setup-gxp-r-project — security in regulated envs
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