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windows-sso

windows-sso

Use when configuring Single Sign-On (SSO) on Windows — Active Directory Federation Services (AD FS), Azure AD / Entra ID SSO, SAML 2.0, OAuth 2.0/OIDC, Kerberos delegation, Windows Integrated Authentication (WIA/SPNEGO), claims-based authentication, Web Application Proxy (WAP), conditional access policies, MFA integration, certificate-based auth, SSO troubl…

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GitHub

name: windows-sso description: Use when configuring Single Sign-On (SSO) on Windows — Active Directory Federation Services (AD FS), Azure AD / Entra ID SSO, SAML 2.0, OAuth 2.0/OIDC, Kerberos delegation, Windows Integrated Authentication (WIA/SPNEGO), claims-based authentication, Web Application Proxy (WAP), conditional access policies, MFA integration, certificate-based auth, SSO troubleshooting, and hybrid identity (AD Connect). Part of the windows-* skill family. family: windows disambiguation: Configuring SSO INFRASTRUCTURE on Windows — AD FS, Entra ID, SAML and OIDC federation. Core directory administration is windows-ad-admin; authenticating a Python client is ms-office-enterprise-sso-python.

Windows Single Sign-On (SSO) Administration

Companion skill to windows-powershell (parent), windows-ps-server-admin, and windows-ps-security. Covers enterprise SSO infrastructure across on-premises AD FS, hybrid Azure AD / Entra ID, and federation protocols. Targets Windows Server 2019/2022/2025 and Microsoft Entra ID (formerly Azure AD).

Verify auto-rollover is enabled

Get-AdfsProperties | Select-Object AutoCertificateRollover

Force certificate rollover if nearing expiry

Update-AdfsCertificate -CertificateType Token-Signing -Urgent

</HARD-RULE>

<HARD-RULE>
PROTECT THE AZURE AD CONNECT SERVER AS TIER 0 INFRASTRUCTURE. The AD Connect server has full read/write access to both on-premises AD and Entra ID. Compromise of this server means compromise of the entire hybrid identity environment. Apply the same security controls as domain controllers: restricted admin access, no internet browsing, dedicated admin workstations, PAM/PIM for access, full audit logging, and network isolation.
```powershell
# Verify AD Connect server is domain-joined and in a protected OU
Get-ADComputer -Identity "YOURAADC-SERVER" -Properties MemberOf, DistinguishedName |
    Select-Object Name, DistinguishedName, @{N='OUPath';E={($_.DistinguishedName -split ',',2)[1]}}
# Check who has local admin on the AD Connect server
Invoke-Command -ComputerName YOURAADC-SERVER -ScriptBlock {
    Get-LocalGroupMember -Group "Administrators" | Select-Object Name, ObjectClass, PrincipalSource
}

Reference Files

Detailed code examples, patterns, and configuration are in the reference files below. Read the relevant file when working on that area.

FileCovers
adfs-azuread-saml.mdAD FS configuration, Azure AD/Entra ID SSO, SAML 2.0 implementation
oauth-kerberos-wia.mdOAuth 2.0/OpenID Connect, Kerberos delegation, Windows Integrated Authentication
wap-mfa-hybrid-troubleshooting.mdWeb Application Proxy, Conditional Access/MFA, certificate-based authentication, Azure AD Connect hybrid identity, and SSO troubleshooting


Anti-Patterns

Anti-PatternWhy It FailsCorrect Approach
Configuring SSO without testing token expiration and refreshUsers get logged out mid-session; refresh tokens fail silently; support tickets spikeTest full token lifecycle: login, refresh, expiration, re-authentication; set refresh token lifetime appropriately
Using NTLM fallback as primary authenticationNTLM is vulnerable to relay attacks and pass-the-hash; SSO benefits are lost when Kerberos fails silently to NTLMEnforce Kerberos; audit NTLM usage; fix SPN registration and DNS issues rather than allowing NTLM fallback
Not registering SPNs correctly for service accountsKerberos delegation fails; SSO silently falls back to NTLM or prompts for credentials; intermittent auth failuresUse setspn -L to verify; register SPNs on the correct service account; check for duplicates with setspn -X
Implementing SSO without session timeout policiesUsers remain authenticated indefinitely; shared workstations expose sessions to unauthorized usersConfigure session timeouts (idle and absolute) matching security policy; force re-auth for sensitive operations
Using self-signed certificates for SAML/OIDC in productionCertificate expiration causes complete SSO outage; browsers warn users; trust chain is brokenUse CA-signed certificates; set calendar reminders for renewal 30 days before expiry; automate with ACME where possible

Related Skills

SkillScope
windows-powershellCore PowerShell language, modules, remoting, scripting patterns
windows-ps-server-adminAD DS, DNS, DHCP, IIS, Hyper-V, WSUS, AD CS, server roles
windows-ps-securityWindows Firewall, Defender, BitLocker, audit policy, AppLocker
windows-cmdLegacy CMD commands, batch scripting, system utilities
linux-centrifyCentrify/Delinea on Linux — AD-joined Linux machines in the same SSO infrastructure
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