executing-plans
executing-plans
Use when executing an implementation plan in the current session as the implementer yourself — your human partner chose inline execution, or no subagent tool is available
runway-security-basicsHarden Runway keys, organization access, prompts, media, generated outputs, and support evidence. Use when threat-modeling an integration. Trigger with: "secure Runway API", "Runway key rotation", "Runway media privacy".
Independent GitHub snapshot · Automated classification · Original documentation governs
name: runway-security-basics description: >- Harden Runway keys, organization access, prompts, media, generated outputs, and support evidence. Use when threat-modeling an integration. Trigger with: "secure Runway API", "Runway key rotation", "Runway media privacy". allowed-tools: Read, Grep, Write, Edit version: 2.0.0 argument-hint: '[service-and-data-class]' model: inherit effort: high license: MIT author: Jeremy Longshore jeremy@intentsolutions.io tags:
Runway integrations handle organization-scoped credentials and potentially sensitive media. Security must cover key lifecycle, server-only egress, input rights, temporary URL capabilities, moderation outcomes, output access, evidence minimization, and incident response.
List organization members, roles, keys, consumers, environments, creation dates, and rotation owners. Removing a member does not disable their organization-scoped keys, so revocation is a separate control.
Keep RUNWAYML_API_SECRET in a secret manager and restrict egress to Runway hosts. Prevent browser exposure, repository commits, shell history, build arguments, logs, traces, and support archives.
Verify rights, tenant authorization, data minimization, acceptable-use policy, file type and size, and public-URL exposure. Treat prompts and source media as sensitive application data.
Expect moderation as a failed task and inspect failureCode. Do not automatically retry safety failures or expose unsafe diagnostics; repeated moderated requests can threaten account availability.
Treat public input URLs, runway:// URIs, and signed output URLs as temporary access capabilities. Copy approved output to owned private storage, scan and validate it, and issue internal authorized links.
Rotate keys through a canary, explicitly disable old credentials, scan for leaks, and maintain a playbook for revocation, artifact restriction, customer notification, and evidence deletion.
Bearer secrets authenticate the organization, not an end user. Authorization in the product must therefore occur before the server uses Runway; API authentication does not replace tenant, actor, media-rights, or budget checks.
Use Read and Grep to inspect application configuration, provider documentation, lockfiles, fixtures, schemas, tests, and redacted operational evidence before proposing a change. Use Write or Edit only for an approved implementation, configuration, test, runbook, or redacted receipt. Do not create, cancel, delete, retry, deploy, rotate, revoke, publish, or otherwise mutate production Runway resources without explicit operator approval.
Return the environment, organization alias, operation and task identifiers, API and SDK versions, model or router policy, source-contract fingerprint, task-state evidence, credit boundary, output disposition, unresolved risk, rollback state, and final decision without exposing API secrets, prompt or media contents, or temporary signed URLs.
A developer leaves the organization. The admin removes membership, separately identifies and disables every key used by that service, deploys a replacement secret, proves one read-only canary, and scans logs and artifacts for the old prefix.
| Failure | Response |
|---|---|
| Secret scanner finds a Runway key | Revoke it immediately, restrict the artifact, determine exposure, rotate consumers, and document the incident. |
| Customer media is on a public URL | Stop submission until access and rights meet policy; use a controlled upload path where appropriate. |
| Safety failure is retried automatically | Disable that retry class and review prompt, media, and moderation policy. |
Test client-side bundle inspection, secret scanning, least-privilege deployment access, old-key failure after rotation, media authorization, output URL redaction, safety-failure handling, and evidence expiry.