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name: hunting-for-spearphishing-indicators description: Hunt for spearphishing campaign indicators across email logs, endpoint telemetry, and network data to detect targeted email attacks. domain: cybersecurity subdomain: threat-hunting tags:

• threat-hunting
• mitre-attack
• spearphishing
• initial-access
• email-security
• t1566
• proactive-detection version: '1.0' author: mahipal license: Apache-2.0 d3fend_techniques:
• File Metadata Consistency Validation
• Application Protocol Command Analysis
• Identifier Analysis
• Content Format Conversion
• Message Analysis nist_csf:
• DE.CM-01
• DE.AE-02
• DE.AE-07
• ID.RA-05 mitre_attack:
• T1046
• T1057
• T1082
• T1083
• T1566 mitre_f3: version: '1.1' tactics:
  • reconnaissance
  • initial-access
  • resource-development techniques:
  • id: T1660 name: Phishing tactic: initial-access source: attack
  • id: T1598 name: Phishing for Information tactic: reconnaissance source: attack
  • id: T1593 name: Search Open Websites/Domains tactic: reconnaissance source: attack
  • id: F1031 name: Impersonate Account Holder tactic: initial-access source: f3
  • id: F1020.002 name: 'Create Fake Materials: Fake Website' tactic: resource-development source: f3

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Hunting For Spearphishing Indicators

When to Use

• When proactively hunting for indicators of hunting for spearphishing indicators in the environment
• After threat intelligence indicates active campaigns using these techniques
• During incident response to scope compromise related to these techniques
• When EDR or SIEM alerts trigger on related indicators
• During periodic security assessments and purple team exercises

Prerequisites

• EDR platform with process and network telemetry (CrowdStrike, MDE, SentinelOne)
• SIEM with relevant log data ingested (Splunk, Elastic, Sentinel)
• Sysmon deployed with comprehensive configuration
• Windows Security Event Log forwarding enabled
• Threat intelligence feeds for IOC correlation

Workflow

1. Formulate Hypothesis: Define a testable hypothesis based on threat intelligence or ATT&CK gap analysis.
2. Identify Data Sources: Determine which logs and telemetry are needed to validate or refute the hypothesis.
3. Execute Queries: Run detection queries against SIEM and EDR platforms to collect relevant events.
4. Analyze Results: Examine query results for anomalies, correlating across multiple data sources.
5. Validate Findings: Distinguish true positives from false positives through contextual analysis.
6. Correlate Activity: Link findings to broader attack chains and threat actor TTPs.
7. Document and Report: Record findings, update detection rules, and recommend response actions.

Key Concepts

Concept	Description
T1566.001	Spearphishing Attachment
T1566.002	Spearphishing Link
T1566.003	Spearphishing via Service

Tools & Systems

Tool	Purpose
CrowdStrike Falcon	EDR telemetry and threat detection
Microsoft Defender for Endpoint	Advanced hunting with KQL
Splunk Enterprise	SIEM log analysis with SPL queries
Elastic Security	Detection rules and investigation timeline
Sysmon	Detailed Windows event monitoring
Velociraptor	Endpoint artifact collection and hunting
Sigma Rules	Cross-platform detection rule format

Common Scenarios

1. Scenario 1: Macro-enabled Excel executing PowerShell downloader
2. Scenario 2: HTML smuggling delivering ISO with LNK payload
3. Scenario 3: Credential harvesting link as SharePoint notification
4. Scenario 4: QR code phishing in PDF attachment

Output Format

Hunt ID: TH-HUNTIN-[DATE]-[SEQ]
Technique: T1566.001
Host: [Hostname]
User: [Account context]
Evidence: [Log entries, process trees, network data]
Risk Level: [Critical/High/Medium/Low]
Confidence: [High/Medium/Low]
Recommended Action: [Containment, investigation, monitoring]