---

name: security-audit description: "Security audit — save tampering, cheat vectors, network exploits, data exposure, input validation. Before public or multiplayer release." argument-hint: "[full | network | save | input | quick]" user-invocable: true allowed-tools: Read, Glob, Grep, Bash, Write, Agent, Bash(bash "*/.claude/skills/security-audit/../../hooks/yaml-helper.sh" resolve_config *) model: sonnet

!bash "${CLAUDE_SKILL_DIR}/../../hooks/yaml-helper.sh" resolve_config --keys automation,workflow

Automation mode: Resolve modes.automation (project.local.yaml → project.yaml → default collaborative). Every AskUserQuestion call and every file write follows .claude/docs/automation-modes.md (collaborative asks always · guided major-only · autonomous logs and proceeds; automation_always_ask categories always prompt).

workflow (resolved above) decides only what Phase 7 tells you about the release gate: at standard and full it requires this report; at minimal it does not. The audit itself runs the same at every tier.

Security Audit

Security is not optional for any shipped game. Even single-player games have save tampering vectors. Multiplayer games have cheat surfaces, data exposure risks, and denial-of-service potential. This skill systematically audits the codebase for the most common game security failures and produces a prioritised remediation plan.

Run this skill:

• Before any public release (required for the Polish → Release gate at workflow: standard and full)
• Before enabling any online/multiplayer feature
• After implementing any system that reads from disk or network
• When a security-related bug is reported

Output: production/security/security-audit-[date]-[scope].md — the scope in the name keeps a same-day quick or save run from overwriting the full report the release gate reads.

---

Phase 1: Parse Arguments and Scope

Modes:

• full — all categories (recommended before release)
• network — network/multiplayer only
• save — save file and serialization only
• input — input validation and injection only
• quick — high-severity checks only (fastest, for iterative use)
• No argument — run full

Read project.yaml to determine the following, falling back to .claude/docs/technical-preferences.md for engine/language/platforms when a key is absent or empty:

• engine.name and engine.language — load-bearing: they select the Phase 3 pattern set, and an engine with no sourced set for a category makes that category NOT ASSESSED. If engine.name is absent or empty, say so in the report and treat every grep category as NOT ASSESSED; do not fall back to the Godot lists because they are the ones written out in full

• platform.targets (affects which attack surfaces apply)

• platform.multiplayer and platform.online — whether multiplayer/networking is in scope. technical-preferences.md has no equivalent fields, so the legacy fallback cannot supply them.

  ABSENT DOES NOT MEAN false. These keys have a reader — this skill — and no writer in the setup flow: neither /setup-engine nor /start emits a platform: block, and only /settings sets them, when someone runs it, so on most CCGS projects both keys are absent. Defaulting them to false would skip Category 2 (Network and Multiplayer Security) on every project, genuinely multiplayer ones included — a security category failing open on a value nothing sets.

  When either key is absent or empty: do not assume single-player, and do not skip Category 2. Ask the user whether the game has multiplayer or online features. If you cannot ask, run Category 2 anyway and mark it NOT ASSESSED — multiplayer scope unconfirmed (platform.multiplayer unset — set it with /settings), which makes CLEAR TO SHIP unreachable per Phase 5. While the scope is unconfirmed, rate severity as for a multiplayer game — an open HIGH is then DO NOT SHIP — and say in the report that the rating assumed multiplayer, as security-engineer does. Over-scanning a single-player game costs a few minutes; under-scanning a multiplayer one ships the category unrun.

  Set them explicitly with /settings platform.multiplayer=true (they are project-wide, so --local is refused). Recording it in project.yaml is the fix; this rule is the guard for until someone does.

---

Phase 2: Spawn Security Engineer

Spawn security-engineer via Agent — the audit is its job, so do not run the categories in this session instead. If it cannot be spawned, say why, run the scan here, and let the report's Audited by line say so.

Send this fixed brief template. Fill only the {…} slots, from project.yaml (else technical preferences), the code root resolved per .claude/docs/code-root-resolution.md, and the Phase 3 text copied as written. Add nothing else: no view on the game's type, no expected severity, no opinion on any finding — a sentence of your own is where a pre-rating gets in.

Run a security audit of this project for /security-audit.

Scope: {full | network | save | input | quick}
Engine: {engine.name} {engine.version}, language {engine.language}
platform.multiplayer: {true | false | unset}    platform.online: {true | false | unset}    Phase 1 answer: {multiplayer | single-player | not asked}
Code root: {the resolved code root, or "unresolved"}
Also scan: {assets/data/ and the config files that exist, or "none"}
Categories to run, with their checks and grep patterns for this engine:
{each Phase 3 category this scope runs, copied as written, with the table's row for this engine}
NOT SOURCEABLE on this engine: {categories, or "none"} — report each NOT ASSESSED; never call it reviewed, verified safe or passed
Skipped, with reason: {e.g. "Category 2 — platform.multiplayer and platform.online are false", or "none"}
Report: production/security/security-audit-{date}-{scope}.md — return the report as text; /security-audit writes the file after asking

Severity (rate every finding yourself, against this table only):
- CRITICAL: Remote code execution, data breach, or trivially-exploitable cheat that breaks multiplayer integrity
- HIGH: Save tampering that bypasses progression, credential exposure, or server-side authority bypass
- MEDIUM: Client-side cheat enablement, information disclosure, or input validation gap with limited impact
- LOW: Defence-in-depth improvement — hardening that reduces attack surface but no direct exploit exists
Nothing in this brief sets or suggests a severity. The game's type never lowers a rating: a single-player game is rated on the same table. The one adjustment is upward — when the game is multiplayer, or its scope is unconfirmed (unset and not answered), a HIGH counts as CRITICAL; say so where it applies.
Report each finding as SEC-NNN with category, file:line, description, attack scenario, remediation and effort, grouped by severity.

The template carries the rating rule, so there is nothing to restate: the table already rates save tampering that bypasses progression HIGH, the agent rates each finding against it, and Phase 5 applies the multiplayer rule to the recommendation.

If the code root is unresolved, do not pass a guessed one: every category that scans code is NOT ASSESSED — code root unresolved, and the report says so. An empty code root is the insufficient-implementation case in Phase 5, and each category that scans code reads NOT ASSESSED — no source under <root>, not zero findings. Neither is ever reported clean.

The security-engineer runs the audit across 6 categories (see Phase 3). Collect their full findings before proceeding.

---

Phase 3: Audit Categories

The security-engineer evaluates each of the following. Skip categories not applicable to the project scope, and name each skipped category and why in the Executive Summary (Category 2 — skipped: platform.multiplayer and platform.online are false).

Engine pattern sets — read this before any Category below

Every pattern list in Categories 1–3 was written for Godot. On a Unity or Unreal project they match nothing, and this skill already states what a zero-hit scan means: it renders the report clean, "the most dangerous possible failure for a security audit". That warning was earned along the version axis (File.open vs FileAccess) and the identical hole along the engine axis shipped anyway. Use the table for engine.name resolved in Phase 1.

Category	Godot	Unity	Unreal
1 — Save / serialization	the Godot list below	NOT SOURCEABLE	NOT SOURCEABLE
2 — Network / multiplayer	the Godot list below	ServerRpc, ClientRpc, NetworkVariable, NetworkObject, NetworkManager, NetworkBehaviour, IsServer, IsOwner	UFUNCTION, Server, Client, NetMulticast, Replicated, DOREPLIFETIME, GetLifetimeReplicatedProps, HasAuthority
3 — Input	the Godot list below	InputSystem, PlayerInput, ReadValue, InputValue	EnhancedInput, UInputAction, InputMappingContext, BindAction, FInputActionValue
4 — Data exposure	engine-agnostic — the list below applies to all three
5, 6	judgement and manifests, not greps — no engine set needed

The Unity and Unreal names above are sourced from this repo's pinned references (docs/engine-reference/unity/modules/{networking,input}.md, docs/engine-reference/unreal/modules/{networking,input}.md), not from recall. Verify them against the pin before use and add what the reference documents that this table omits — it is a floor, not a complete set.

NOT SOURCEABLE is a verdict, not a gap to fill from memory. Neither reference tree carries a serialization/save module, so the save-API names for Unity and Unreal cannot be confirmed here. Do not write them from training data. A confidently wrong pattern list is worse in this skill than in any other: it produces a scan that looks thorough, finds nothing, and reads as a pass. Where the table says NOT SOURCEABLE, that category is NOT ASSESSED for this engine — see Phase 5. To close it properly, add a save/serialization module, sourced like the others, to docs/engine-reference/<engine>/modules/; when one is there, take the category's pattern names from it, cite it in the report, and the category runs.

Category 1: Save File and Serialization Security

• Are save files validated before loading? (no blind deserialization)
• Are save file paths constructed from user input? (path traversal risk)
• Are save files checksummed or signed? (tamper detection)
• Does the game trust numeric values from save files without bounds checking?
• Are there any eval() or dynamic code execution calls near save loading?

Grep patterns — check the pinned engine reference before trusting this list (see the API-name warning below): FileAccess, File.open, open(, load, deserialize, parse, parse_string, from_json, read_file, get_var, bytes_to_var — check each for validation.

API names are version-specific and this list is a starting point, not a complete set. File.open is Godot 3.x; Godot 4 renamed the class to FileAccess (docs/engine-reference/godot/breaking-changes.md). Before relying on these patterns, read docs/engine-reference/<engine>/ for the version this project pins and add the names it documents. A grep for a class that no longer exists returns zero hits, and zero hits in this category renders the report clean — which is the most dangerous possible failure for a security audit. Searching only File.open against a Godot 4 project finds nothing and reports CLEAR TO SHIP on a codebase nobody checked. If you cannot confirm the correct names for the pinned version, say so in the report rather than presenting a zero-hit scan as a pass.

Category 2: Network and Multiplayer Security (skip if single-player only)

• Is game state authoritative on the server, or does the client dictate outcomes?
• Are incoming network packets validated for size, type, and value range?
• Are player positions and state changes validated server-side?
• Is there rate limiting on any network calls?
• Are authentication tokens handled correctly (never sent in plaintext)?
• Does the game expose any debug endpoints in release builds?

Grep for: recv, receive, PacketPeer, socket, MultiplayerPeer, ENetMultiplayerPeer, NetworkedMultiplayerPeer, rpc, rpc_id, @rpc — check each call site for validation.

Same version caveat as Category 1. NetworkedMultiplayerPeer is Godot 3.x; Godot 4 uses ENetMultiplayerPeer (docs/engine-reference/godot/modules/networking.md). The bare substring MultiplayerPeer matches both and is the safer probe.

Category 3: Input Validation

• Are any player-supplied strings used in file paths? (path traversal)
• Are any player-supplied strings logged without sanitization? (log injection)
• Are numeric inputs (e.g., item quantities, character stats) bounds-checked before use?
• Are achievement/stat values checked before being written to any backend?

Grep for: get_input, Input.get_, input_map, user-facing text fields — check validation.

Category 4: Data Exposure

• Are any API keys, credentials, or secrets hardcoded in the code root or assets/?
• Are debug symbols or verbose error messages included in release builds?
• Does the game log sensitive player data to disk or console?
• Are any internal file paths or system information exposed to players?

Grep case-insensitively in release-facing code for: api[_-]?key, secret, password, token, private[_-]?key, sk_live, BEGIN PRIVATE KEY, DEBUG, and the engine's print call (print( on Godot, Debug.Log on Unity, UE_LOG on Unreal).

Category 5: Cheat and Anti-Tamper Vectors

• Are gameplay-critical values stored only in memory, not in easily-editable files?
• Are any critical game progression flags (e.g., "has paid for DLC") validated server-side?
• Is there any protection against memory editing tools (Cheat Engine, etc.) for multiplayer?
• Are leaderboard/score submissions validated before acceptance?

Note: Client-side anti-cheat is largely unenforceable. Focus on server-side validation for anything competitive or monetised.

Category 6: Dependency and Supply Chain

• Are any third-party plugins or libraries used? List them.
• Do any plugins have known CVEs in the version being used?
• Are plugin sources verified (official marketplace, reviewed repository)?

Glob for: addons/, plugins/, third_party/, vendor/ — list all external dependencies.

---

Phase 4: Classify Findings

For each finding, assign:

Severity:

Level	Definition
CRITICAL	Remote code execution, data breach, or trivially-exploitable cheat that breaks multiplayer integrity
HIGH	Save tampering that bypasses progression, credential exposure, or server-side authority bypass
MEDIUM	Client-side cheat enablement, information disclosure, or input validation gap with limited impact
LOW	Defence-in-depth improvement — hardening that reduces attack surface but no direct exploit exists

Status: Open / Accepted Risk / Out of Scope

---

Phase 5: Generate Report

# Security Audit Report

**Date**: [date]
**Scope**: [full | network | save | input | quick]
**Engine**: [engine + version]
**Audited by**: [security-engineer via /security-audit | this session — security-engineer not spawned: reason]
**Files scanned**: [N source files, N config files]

---

## Executive Summary

| Severity | Count | Must Fix Before Release |
|----------|-------|------------------------|
| CRITICAL | [N] | Yes — all |
| HIGH | [N] | Yes — all |
| MEDIUM | [N] | Recommended |
| LOW | [N] | Optional |

**Release recommendation**: [NOT ASSESSED — INSUFFICIENT IMPLEMENTATION / CLEAR TO SHIP / FIX BEFORE SHIPPING / DO NOT SHIP]

Choose it by the open findings, first match wins:
- **DO NOT SHIP** — any open CRITICAL finding (in a multiplayer game, any open HIGH
  counts as CRITICAL)
- **FIX BEFORE SHIPPING** — open HIGH findings and no CRITICAL; the Polish → Release
  gate needs zero open HIGH (at `standard` and `full`)
- **NOT ASSESSED** — per the rule below, when the scan could not cover the surface.
  It ranks below both failure values — a known finding is more actionable than an
  unscanned category, and still has to be fixed — and above CLEAR TO SHIP
- **CLEAR TO SHIP** — no open CRITICAL or HIGH (MEDIUM and LOW may remain)

> **`NOT ASSESSED` is required when there was not enough implemented surface to
> audit**, or when the API names for the pinned engine version could not be
> confirmed — **in place of CLEAR TO SHIP, never of a failure value.** An open
> CRITICAL or HIGH still decides the recommendation (first match above): a run
> with an unscanned category and an open HIGH is FIX BEFORE SHIPPING, and names
> the unscanned category beside it. A zero-finding scan over two files of source is not a clean bill of
> health, and `CLEAR TO SHIP` must never be reachable by having nothing to look
> at. Name what was missing and which skill produces it.
>
> **The engine axis is part of that rule, not a separate one.** If
> the Phase 3 table marks a category `NOT SOURCEABLE` for this project's
> `engine.name`, that category is `NOT ASSESSED` — state it by name in the
> Executive Summary, and **`CLEAR TO SHIP` is unreachable for the run**. The
> category reads `NOT ASSESSED — <category> has no sourced pattern set for
> <engine>`; the release recommendation is still the first match above, so it is
> NOT ASSESSED only where the run would otherwise have been CLEAR TO SHIP. Never
> report the category as reviewed by other means: files it covers may still be
> read for another category, and a finding that read turns up is reported, but
> the category stays NOT ASSESSED — never "reviewed", "verified safe" or passed.
> A scan that could not look is not a scan that found nothing, and only the
> report can tell the reader which of the two happened.

---

## CRITICAL Findings

### SEC-001: [Title]
**Category**: [Save / Network / Input / Data / Cheat / Dependency]
**File**: `[path]` line [N]
**Description**: [What the vulnerability is]
**Attack scenario**: [How a malicious user would exploit it]
**Remediation**: [Specific code change or pattern to apply]
**Effort**: [Low / Medium / High]

[repeat per finding]

---

## HIGH Findings

[same format]

---

## MEDIUM Findings

[same format]

---

## LOW Findings

[same format]

---

## Accepted Risk

[Any findings explicitly accepted by the team with rationale]

---

## Dependency Inventory

| Plugin / Library | Version | Source | Known CVEs |
|-----------------|---------|--------|------------|
| [name] | [version] | [source] | [none / CVE-XXXX-NNNN] |

---

## Remediation Priority Order

1. [SEC-NNN] — [1-line description] — Est. effort: [Low/Medium/High]
2. ...

---

## Re-Audit Trigger

Run `/security-audit` again after remediating any CRITICAL or HIGH findings.
At `workflow: standard` and `full`, the Polish → Release gate requires this report with no open CRITICAL or HIGH items.

---

Phase 6: Write Report

Present the report summary (executive summary + CRITICAL/HIGH findings only) in conversation.

Ask: "May I write the full security audit report to production/security/security-audit-[date]-[scope].md?"

Write only after approval.

---

Phase 7: Gate Integration

This report is a required artifact for the Polish → Release gate at workflow: standard and full; the minimal gate drops it with everything but smoke and S1 bugs. Say which applies to this project, from the workflow resolved above.

After remediating findings, re-run: /security-audit quick to confirm CRITICAL/HIGH items are resolved before running /gate-check release.

Branch on the release recommendation, not on the finding counts alone:

If it is DO NOT SHIP (an open CRITICAL, or an open HIGH in a multiplayer game):

"⛔ CRITICAL security findings must be resolved before any public release. Do not proceed to /launch-checklist until these are addressed."

If it is FIX BEFORE SHIPPING (open HIGH findings, no CRITICAL, single-player):

At workflow: standard/full: "⚠️ [N] HIGH finding(s) are open. The Polish → Release gate's security audit item requires none — fix them and re-run /security-audit quick before /gate-check release."

At minimal: "⚠️ [N] HIGH finding(s) are open — fix them and re-run /security-audit quick before you ship. The minimal release gate does not read this report; the open HIGH still makes the recommendation FIX BEFORE SHIPPING."

If it is NOT ASSESSED:

"Security audit NOT ASSESSED — [each category not assessed, and why]. The report is written. [At workflow: standard/full:] /gate-check release will report its security item NOT ASSESSED until [the missing input] is supplied and the audit re-run. [At minimal:] The minimal release gate does not read this report, but those categories stay unscanned until [the missing input] is supplied."

Name the missing input for each category: engine.name, the code root, the multiplayer scope (/settings platform.multiplayer=…), or — for a category the Phase 3 table marks NOT SOURCEABLE on this engine, the usual cause on Unity and Unreal — a save/serialization module in docs/engine-reference/<engine>/modules/ (Phase 3), naming that category.

If it is CLEAR TO SHIP:

"✅ No blocking security findings. Report written to production/security/. Include this path when running /gate-check release."

---

Collaborative Protocol

• Never assume a pattern is safe — flag it and let the user decide
• Accepted risk is a valid outcome — some LOW findings are acceptable trade-offs for a solo team; document the decision
• Multiplayer games have a higher bar — any HIGH finding in a multiplayer context should be treated as CRITICAL
• This is not a penetration test — this audit covers common patterns; a real pentest by a human security professional is recommended before any competitive or monetised multiplayer launch