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생산성 및 협업 · SKILL.md

cohere-enterprise-rbac

cohere-enterprise-rbac

Map Cohere Team Owner and User roles to application authorization, key ownership, tenant isolation, and audit controls. Use when governing multi-team Cohere access. Trigger with "Cohere RBAC", "Cohere team roles", or "Cohere enterprise keys".

Independent GitHub snapshot · Automated classification · Original documentation governs

Skill 문서

GitHub

name: cohere-enterprise-rbac description: >- Map Cohere Team Owner and User roles to application authorization, key ownership, tenant isolation, and audit controls. Use when governing multi-team Cohere access. Trigger with "Cohere RBAC", "Cohere team roles", or "Cohere enterprise keys". argument-hint: "[team] [environment] [role-review]" allowed-tools: Read, Glob, Grep, WebFetch, Write, Edit version: 1.6.0 author: Jeremy Longshore jeremy@intentsolutions.io license: MIT tags:

  • saas
  • cohere
  • access-control model: inherit effort: high compatibility: Designed for Claude Code; live verification requires network access and an approved Cohere API key

Cohere Enterprise Access Control

Overview

Use Cohere's documented Team roles for platform administration while enforcing fine-grained workload authorization in the application and secret manager.

Prerequisites

  • The target repository, runtime, environment, and accountable owner
  • An approved Cohere team and key for any live verification
  • Current quality, security, privacy, capacity, and change-control requirements

Tool Discipline

Use Read, Glob, and Grep to inspect code, configuration, and evidence. Use WebFetch only for current Cohere primary documentation. Use Write or Edit only when the user requested implementation and the exact target files are known; never write credentials or customer content.

Current Contract

  • Cohere Teams document Owner and User roles; Owners have additional membership, production-key, billing, and production-form powers.
  • Team users can still have broad key and usage capabilities, so provider roles alone are not application RBAC.
  • Separate human administration from runtime service identities and environment-specific credentials.
  • Enforce tenant, model, endpoint, tool, and budget policy before provider calls.

Authentication

Use an environment-specific key injected from an approved secret manager. Never print, persist, commit, or place CO_API_KEY in an example. Confirm access with the least costly bounded operation appropriate to the task, and treat key creation, rotation, revocation, role changes, and production-capacity requests as owner-approved actions.

Instructions

  1. Inventory Cohere teams, members, roles, keys, environments, service identities, and billing owners.
  2. Map Owner and User capabilities to least-privilege job functions and separation-of-duties requirements.
  3. Move runtime keys into approved secret stores and bind retrieval to named workloads.
  4. Implement application authorization for tenant data, allowed models, endpoints, tools, and spend.
  5. Review membership, keys, usage, invoices, and access evidence on a fixed cadence.
  6. Test member removal, key rotation, service revocation, tenant denial, and emergency access.

Approval Boundaries

Do not expose or rotate keys, change Cohere Team roles, accept commercial terms, enable sensitive production data, increase spend or capacity, switch production models, send a support bundle, or execute model-proposed side effects without the accountable owner's approval. Keep diagnosis read-only unless implementation was requested.

Output

Return the resolved API and model contract, files or settings inspected, evidence collected, validation result, remaining risk, owner, and rollback or next action. Redact keys, authorization headers, prompts, retrieved documents, embeddings, customer identifiers, and unrestricted environment output.

Error Handling

ConditionResponse
Orphaned ownerAssign an accountable owner before changing production access.
Shared human keyReplace it with workload-owned environment credentials.
Role too broadCompensate with secret-manager and application policy or escalate.
Former memberRemove access and rotate credentials they could retrieve.

Examples

Use this compact handoff shape to keep the selected scope, validation evidence, and operational result reviewable.

Input:

team=platform-ai; environments=staging,prod; tenants=multi; review=quarterly

Expected handoff:

roles=mapped; keys=workload-owned; app-rbac=enforced; review=evidenced

Resources

저장한 Skills