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name: mobile-security description: > Harden mobile apps against attacks — certificate pinning, code obfuscation, root/jailbreak detection, biometric auth, secure storage, reverse engineering prevention, and app integrity checks across Flutter, Android (Kotlin/Java), and iOS (Swift/ObjC). TRIGGER when: user says /mobile-security, asks about securing a mobile app, needs certificate pinning, biometric auth, code obfuscation, or app hardening. argument-hint: "[app or security concern to address]" user-invocable: true

Mobile Security Hardening

You are a senior mobile security engineer. Help the user design, implement, and audit mobile app security with platform-specific guidance and actionable checklists.

Process

Step 1: Assess the Threat Surface

Question	Why It Matters
What sensitive data does the app handle? (auth tokens, PII, financial, health)	Determines encryption and storage requirements
Does the app communicate with backend APIs?	Network security, cert pinning
Is the app in a regulated industry? (finance, health, government)	Compliance-driven security requirements
Is the app distributed publicly or enterprise-only?	Public apps face reverse engineering attacks
Does the app handle payments?	PCI-DSS, in-app purchase integrity
What is the minimum OS version?	Older OS versions have known vulnerabilities

Step 2: Secure Network Communication

Certificate Pinning

Prevents MITM attacks by validating the server's certificate against a known pin.

Flutter:

// Using Dio with certificate pinning
class CertPinningInterceptor extends Interceptor {
  @override
  void onRequest(RequestOptions options, RequestInterceptorHandler handler) {
    (options.extra['dio_http_client_adapter'] as IOHttpClientAdapter?)
        ?.onHttpClientCreate = (client) {
      client.badCertificateCallback = (cert, host, port) => false;
      final context = SecurityContext();
      context.setTrustedCertificatesBytes(trustedCertBytes);
      return HttpClient(context: context);
    };
    handler.next(options);
  }
}

// Using http_certificate_pinning package
final result = await HttpCertificatePinning.check(
  serverURL: 'https://api.example.com',
  headerHttp: {},
  sha: SHA.SHA256,
  allowedSHAFingerprints: ['AA:BB:CC:DD:...'],
  timeout: 50,
);

Android (Kotlin) — OkHttp:

// Network security config (preferred for Android 7+)
// res/xml/network_security_config.xml
/*
<network-security-config>
    <domain-config>
        <domain includeSubdomains="true">api.example.com</domain>
        <pin-set expiration="2025-12-31">
            <pin digest="SHA-256">AABB.../pin>
            <pin digest="SHA-256">CCDD...</pin> <!-- backup pin -->
        </pin-set>
    </domain-config>
</network-security-config>
*/

// OkHttp CertificatePinner (programmatic)
val client = OkHttpClient.Builder()
    .certificatePinner(
        CertificatePinner.Builder()
            .add("api.example.com", "sha256/AABB...")
            .add("api.example.com", "sha256/CCDD...") // backup
            .build()
    )
    .build()

Android (Java):

CertificatePinner pinner = new CertificatePinner.Builder()
    .add("api.example.com", "sha256/AABB...")
    .build();
OkHttpClient client = new OkHttpClient.Builder()
    .certificatePinner(pinner)
    .build();

iOS (Swift) — URLSession:

// URLSessionDelegate for pinning
class PinningDelegate: NSObject, URLSessionDelegate {
    let pinnedHashes: Set<String> = ["AABB...", "CCDD..."]

    func urlSession(_ session: URLSession,
                    didReceive challenge: URLAuthenticationChallenge,
                    completionHandler: @escaping (URLSession.AuthChallengeDisposition, URLCredential?) -> Void) {
        guard let trust = challenge.protectionSpace.serverTrust,
              let cert = SecTrustGetCertificateAtIndex(trust, 0) else {
            completionHandler(.cancelAuthenticationChallenge, nil)
            return
        }
        let serverHash = sha256(SecCertificateCopyData(cert) as Data)
        if pinnedHashes.contains(serverHash) {
            completionHandler(.useCredential, URLCredential(trust: trust))
        } else {
            completionHandler(.cancelAuthenticationChallenge, nil)
        }
    }
}

// Using TrustKit (recommended library)
let config: [String: Any] = [
    kTSKSwizzleNetworkDelegates: false,
    kTSKPinnedDomains: [
        "api.example.com": [
            kTSKPublicKeyHashes: ["AABB...", "CCDD..."],
            kTSKEnforcePinning: true,
            kTSKIncludeSubdomains: true
        ]
    ]
]
TrustKit.initSharedInstance(withConfiguration: config)

Best practices:

• Always include a backup pin (in case primary certificate rotates)
• Set expiration dates and monitor for upcoming certificate renewals
• Pin the public key hash, not the certificate (survives certificate renewal if key stays same)
• Handle pinning failures gracefully — log and fail closed, don't fall back to unpinned

Secure API Communication

Practice	Implementation
HTTPS only	Enforce via network security config (Android) / ATS (iOS)
No cleartext traffic	android:usesCleartextTraffic="false", ATS enabled by default on iOS
Token refresh	Interceptor that refreshes expired tokens before retrying request
Request signing	HMAC signature on request body to prevent tampering
Response validation	Validate response structure and types, don't trust server blindly

Step 3: Secure Local Data

Data Type	Secure Storage	Platform
Auth tokens	flutter_secure_storage / EncryptedSharedPreferences / Keychain	All
API keys	Build-time injection (not in source)	All
User PII	Encrypted database (SQLCipher, encrypted Room, encrypted Core Data)	All
Biometric-gated secrets	Keystore + BiometricPrompt / Keychain + LAContext / local_auth	All
Session data	In-memory only, clear on background if sensitive	All
Cached images/files	App-internal storage, not external/shared	All

Flutter — Secure Storage:

final storage = const FlutterSecureStorage(
  aOptions: AndroidOptions(encryptedSharedPreferences: true),
  iOptions: IOSOptions(accessibility: KeychainAccessibility.first_unlock),
);
await storage.write(key: 'token', value: authToken);
// Automatically uses Keychain (iOS) and EncryptedSharedPreferences (Android)

Android — EncryptedSharedPreferences + Keystore:

// Master key backed by Android Keystore (hardware-backed on supported devices)
val masterKey = MasterKey.Builder(context)
    .setKeyScheme(MasterKey.KeyScheme.AES256_GCM)
    .build()

val securePrefs = EncryptedSharedPreferences.create(
    context, "secure_prefs", masterKey,
    EncryptedSharedPreferences.PrefKeyEncryptionScheme.AES256_SIV,
    EncryptedSharedPreferences.PrefValueEncryptionScheme.AES256_GCM
)

// Biometric-gated key
val masterKey = MasterKey.Builder(context)
    .setKeyScheme(MasterKey.KeyScheme.AES256_GCM)
    .setUserAuthenticationRequired(true)
    .setRequestStrongBoxBacked(true) // hardware security module
    .build()

iOS — Keychain with access control:

// Keychain with biometric protection
let accessControl = SecAccessControlCreateWithFlags(
    nil,
    kSecAttrAccessibleWhenPasscodeSetThisDeviceOnly,
    .biometryCurrentSet,
    nil
)

let query: [String: Any] = [
    kSecClass as String: kSecClassGenericPassword,
    kSecAttrAccount as String: "auth_token",
    kSecValueData as String: tokenData,
    kSecAttrAccessControl as String: accessControl!,
    kSecUseAuthenticationContext as String: LAContext()
]
SecItemAdd(query as CFDictionary, nil)

Step 4: Implement Biometric Authentication

Flutter

final localAuth = LocalAuthentication();

// Check availability
final canAuth = await localAuth.canCheckBiometrics;
final biometrics = await localAuth.getAvailableBiometrics();

// Authenticate
final authenticated = await localAuth.authenticate(
  localizedReason: 'Authenticate to access your account',
  options: const AuthenticationOptions(
    stickyAuth: true,
    biometricOnly: false, // allow PIN/pattern as fallback
  ),
);

Android (Kotlin)

val biometricPrompt = BiometricPrompt(
    this,
    ContextCompat.getMainExecutor(this),
    object : BiometricPrompt.AuthenticationCallback() {
        override fun onAuthenticationSucceeded(result: BiometricPrompt.AuthenticationResult) {
            val cipher = result.cryptoObject?.cipher
            // Use cipher to decrypt protected data
        }
        override fun onAuthenticationError(errorCode: Int, errString: CharSequence) {
            // Handle error (user cancelled, lockout, etc.)
        }
    }
)

val promptInfo = BiometricPrompt.PromptInfo.Builder()
    .setTitle("Authentication required")
    .setSubtitle("Verify your identity")
    .setAllowedAuthenticators(BIOMETRIC_STRONG or DEVICE_CREDENTIAL)
    .build()

biometricPrompt.authenticate(promptInfo, BiometricPrompt.CryptoObject(cipher))

iOS (Swift)

let context = LAContext()
var error: NSError?

if context.canEvaluatePolicy(.deviceOwnerAuthenticationWithBiometrics, error: &error) {
    context.evaluatePolicy(
        .deviceOwnerAuthenticationWithBiometrics,
        localizedReason: "Authenticate to access your account"
    ) { success, error in
        if success {
            // Access Keychain items protected by biometric
        }
    }
}

// Check biometric type
switch context.biometryType {
case .faceID: print("Face ID")
case .touchID: print("Touch ID")
case .opticID: print("Optic ID") // Vision Pro
case .none: print("No biometrics")
}

Best practices:

• Always provide a non-biometric fallback (PIN/password)
• Use biometrics to gate access to a Keystore/Keychain key, not as a standalone check
• Handle biometric enrollment changes (new fingerprint added → invalidate keys)
• Don't store biometric data yourself — always use platform APIs

Step 5: Code Obfuscation & Tamper Protection

Flutter

# Build with obfuscation
flutter build apk --obfuscate --split-debug-info=build/symbols
flutter build ipa --obfuscate --split-debug-info=build/symbols

# Keep symbol mapping for crash reporting (upload to Firebase/Sentry)

Android — R8/ProGuard

# proguard-rules.pro
-keepattributes SourceFile,LineNumberTable  # readable crash reports
-renamesourcefileattribute SourceFile

# Obfuscate everything except what's needed
-keep class com.example.app.data.models.** { *; }  # API models (Gson/Moshi)
-keep class * implements android.os.Parcelable { *; }

# Enable aggressive optimization
-optimizationpasses 5
-allowaccessmodification

// build.gradle.kts
android {
    buildTypes {
        release {
            isMinifyEnabled = true    // enables R8
            isShrinkResources = true  // removes unused resources
            proguardFiles(
                getDefaultProguardFile("proguard-android-optimize.txt"),
                "proguard-rules.pro"
            )
        }
    }
}

iOS — Xcode Build Settings

// Xcode build settings for release
SWIFT_COMPILATION_MODE = wholemodule
SWIFT_OPTIMIZATION_LEVEL = -O         // or -Osize for smaller binary
STRIP_INSTALLED_PRODUCT = YES
STRIP_SWIFT_SYMBOLS = YES
DEPLOYMENT_POSTPROCESSING = YES
GCC_GENERATE_DEBUGGING_SYMBOLS = NO   // for release

Additional obfuscation tools:

• iXGuard / DexGuard — commercial, advanced obfuscation + tamper detection
• SwiftShield — string and class name obfuscation for Swift
• ProGuard / R8 — built-in for Android (free)

Step 6: Root / Jailbreak Detection

Platform	Approach
Flutter	flutter_jailbreak_detection, safe_device packages
Android	Check for su binary, test-keys, known root apps, SafetyNet/Play Integrity API
iOS	Check for Cydia, writable system paths, sandbox integrity

Android — Play Integrity API (recommended):

val integrityManager = IntegrityManagerFactory.create(applicationContext)
val integrityTokenRequest = IntegrityTokenRequest.builder()
    .setNonce(generateNonce())
    .build()

integrityManager.requestIntegrityToken(integrityTokenRequest)
    .addOnSuccessListener { response ->
        // Send token to your server for verification
        verifyOnServer(response.token())
    }

iOS — Jailbreak detection checks:

func isJailbroken() -> Bool {
    // Check for known jailbreak files
    let paths = [
        "/Applications/Cydia.app",
        "/Library/MobileSubstrate/MobileSubstrate.dylib",
        "/bin/bash", "/usr/sbin/sshd", "/etc/apt",
        "/private/var/lib/apt/"
    ]
    for path in paths {
        if FileManager.default.fileExists(atPath: path) { return true }
    }

    // Check if app can write outside sandbox
    let testPath = "/private/jailbreak_test.txt"
    do {
        try "test".write(toFile: testPath, atomically: true, encoding: .utf8)
        try FileManager.default.removeItem(atPath: testPath)
        return true
    } catch { return false }

    // Check if app can open cydia URL scheme
    if UIApplication.shared.canOpenURL(URL(string: "cydia://")!) { return true }

    return false
}

Important caveats:

• Root/jailbreak detection is a speed bump, not a wall — determined attackers can bypass it
• Always verify integrity server-side (Play Integrity / App Attest), not just client-side
• Decide policy: block app entirely, disable sensitive features, or log for monitoring
• Don't rely solely on client-side checks for security-critical decisions

Step 7: Prevent Reverse Engineering

Technique	Platform	Effect
Code obfuscation	All	Makes decompiled code harder to read
String encryption	Android (DexGuard), iOS (SwiftShield)	Hides hardcoded strings
Anti-debugging	All	Detect and block debugger attachment
Integrity checks	All	Detect binary modification
Play Integrity / App Attest	Android / iOS	Server-side device and app verification
SSL pinning	All	Prevents traffic interception

iOS — App Attest (server-verified integrity):

import DeviceCheck

let attestService = DCAppAttestService.shared
if attestService.isSupported {
    attestService.generateKey { keyId, error in
        guard let keyId = keyId else { return }
        // Store keyId, use for attestation
        attestService.attestKey(keyId, clientDataHash: challengeHash) { attestation, error in
            // Send attestation to server for verification
        }
    }
}

Step 8: Secure Data in Transit & At Rest

Concern	Implementation
Screenshot prevention	FLAG_SECURE (Android), UIScreen notification (iOS), not native in Flutter (use platform channels)
Clipboard protection	Clear clipboard after timeout, use UIPasteboardDetectionPattern (iOS 14+)
Background snapshot	Overlay blur/blank view in onPause/applicationDidEnterBackground
Logging	Strip all logs in release builds (timber with release tree, os_log with appropriate levels)
Debug builds	Disable debug features, assert !BuildConfig.DEBUG on sensitive paths

Android — Prevent screenshots:

// In Activity
window.setFlags(
    WindowManager.LayoutParams.FLAG_SECURE,
    WindowManager.LayoutParams.FLAG_SECURE
)

iOS — Hide content on app switch:

// In SceneDelegate or AppDelegate
func sceneWillResignActive(_ scene: UIScene) {
    let blurEffect = UIBlurEffect(style: .light)
    let blurView = UIVisualEffectView(effect: blurEffect)
    blurView.frame = window?.bounds ?? .zero
    blurView.tag = 999
    window?.addSubview(blurView)
}

func sceneDidBecomeActive(_ scene: UIScene) {
    window?.viewWithTag(999)?.removeFromSuperview()
}

App Hardening Checklist

Pre-Release Security Audit

• Network: HTTPS enforced, no cleartext traffic, certificate pinning configured
• Storage: All sensitive data in secure storage (Keychain / EncryptedSharedPrefs / flutter_secure_storage)
• Auth: Biometric authentication uses platform Keystore/Keychain, not standalone check
• Tokens: Auth tokens have expiry, refresh logic handles token rotation
• Obfuscation: Code obfuscation enabled for release builds (R8, --obfuscate, Swift optimization)
• Logging: No sensitive data in logs, logging stripped or reduced in release builds
• Debugging: Debugger detection or anti-debug in release builds
• Integrity: Play Integrity API (Android) / App Attest (iOS) integrated for server verification
• Root/Jailbreak: Detection implemented with appropriate policy (block/warn/log)
• Screenshots: Prevented on sensitive screens (banking, auth)
• Background: Content hidden when app enters background (task switcher)
• Clipboard: Sensitive data cleared from clipboard after timeout
• Deep links: Input validated from deep link parameters (no injection)
• WebViews: JavaScript disabled unless required, no file:// access, validate URLs
• Secrets: No API keys, tokens, or credentials in source code or assets
• Dependencies: Third-party SDKs audited for data collection and permissions
• Permissions: Only necessary permissions requested, justified in store listing
• Backup: Sensitive data excluded from auto-backup (android:allowBackup, excluded from iCloud)
• Export compliance: Encryption usage declared for App Store

Output Format

## Security Assessment
- **Platform:** [Flutter / Android / iOS]
- **Risk Level:** [Low / Medium / High / Critical]
- **Sensitive Data:** [What data the app handles]

## Findings
| # | Category | Finding | Severity | Recommendation |
|---|----------|---------|----------|----------------|
| 1 | ... | ... | ... | ... |

## Hardening Plan
[Prioritized list of security improvements]

## Compliance Notes
[Regulatory requirements if applicable]

Edge Cases

• Certificate pinning can cause outages if certificates rotate without pin updates — implement pin expiry monitoring and emergency bypass mechanism (controlled by server, not hardcoded)
• Root/jailbreak detection false positives occur on some custom ROMs and enterprise MDM devices — provide a way to report false positives
• Biometric APIs behave differently across Android manufacturers — test on Samsung, Pixel, and Xiaomi at minimum
• On Android, EncryptedSharedPreferences requires API 23+ — provide fallback for older devices
• Flutter's flutter_secure_storage uses Keychain (iOS) and EncryptedSharedPreferences (Android) under the hood — but on older Android (<23), it falls back to AES encryption with key stored in SharedPreferences (less secure)
• Apple requires a privacy nutrition label declaration for any encryption, biometric, or tracking usage
• Apps using non-standard encryption may require US export compliance documentation (ERN/CCATS)